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While open source software (OSS) emphasizes open access to the source code and 
avoids the use of formal appropriability mechanisms, there has been little understanding 
of how the existence and exercise of formal intellectual property rights (IPR) such as 
patents influence the direction of OSS innovation. This dissertation seeks to bridge this 
gap in prior literature by focusing on two closely related topics. First, it investigates how 
OSS adoption and production are influenced by IPR enforcement exercised by 
proprietary incumbents. Second, it examines the impact of royalty-free patent pools 
contributed by OSS-friendly incumbents on OSS innovation. It particularly looks at the 
influence of such patent pools on OSS product entry by start-up firms.  
The first chapter provides an overview on the dissertation. The second chapter 
investigates how intellectual property rights (IPR) enforcement against open source 
software (OSS) affects the adoption and production of related OSS projects. This chapter 
suggests that when an IPR enforcement action is filed, user interest and developer activity 
will be negatively affected in two types of related OSS projects—those that display 
technology overlap with the litigated OSS and business projects that are specific to a 
focal litigated platform. These hypotheses are examined using two widely publicized 
lawsuits—SCO v. IBM and FireStar/DataTern v. Red Hat. The empirical analyses are 
based on data from SourceForge.net. The difference-in-difference estimates show that in 
the months following the filing of SCO v. IBM, OSS projects that exhibit high technology 
overlap with the litigated OSS experienced a 15% greater decline in user interest and 
60% greater decline in developer activity than projects in the control group; OSS projects 
 xii
that are intended for business and specific to a litigated OSS platform had a 34% greater 
decline in user interest and 86% larger decrease in developer activity than the control 
group. Similar results are also found following the filing of FireStar/DataTern v. Red 
Hat. These results are robust to a variety of robustness checks, including a falsification 
exercise and subsample analyses.  
The third chapter examines whether open source software (OSS) patent pools 
contributed by large software incumbents influence new OSS product entry by start-up 
software firms. It argues that increases in the size of the OSS patent pool related to a 
software segment will facilitate OSS entry by start-up firms into the same segment; 
further, the marginal effect of the pool on OSS entry will be especially large in software 
segments where the cumulativeness of innovation is high or where patent ownership in a 
segment is concentrated.  These hypotheses are empirically tested through examining the 
impacts of a major OSS patent pool—the Patent Commons, established by IBM and a 
few others in 2005—on OSS entry by 2,054 start-up firms from 1999 to 2009. The 
empirical results largely support these hypotheses and are robust to adding a variety of 








 Open source software (OSS) has emerged as a new model of software innovation 
that draws upon public knowledge contributed by many individuals and commercial 
firms (von Hippel and von Krogh 2003). The success of OSS has been evidenced by the 
rapid growth of the Linux ecosystem that was worth $25 billion as of 2008, the 
widespread adoption of Apache HTTP Server by 2.6 million newly established websites 
as of 2009, and the surge of the Android platform which hit a 60 percent market share for 
smartphone mobile operating system as of early 2012. Correspondingly, a body of 
literature has investigated the determinants of OSS success within the communities of 
developers and users (e.g. Stewart et al. 2006, Grewal et al. 2006) as well as how 
commercial firms appropriate value from open source innovation (e.g. West 2003, 
Fosfuri et al. 2008). It has also been emphasized that the driving force for the growth of 
OSS is its open access to the source code and the resulting freedom in modifying and 
advancing the software (Maurer and Scotchmer 2006).  
 However, one important issue that has been addressed little in prior literature is 
how the existence and exercise of formal intellectual property rights (IPR) such as patents 
play a role in influencing the direction of OSS innovation. The highly cumulative 
innovation process within the open source community, along with the difficulty in 
identifying source code ownership, makes OSS easily targeted by proprietary holders of 
IPR. This problem becomes even more acute when proprietary IPR holders face fierce 
competition from OSS and thus have incentives to dampen its diffusion, and when formal 
IPR have become increasingly valid and enforceable because of recent changes to US 
law. The best-known examples include the set of lawsuits against Linux by the SCO 
group and the recent cases against Android. One immediate question is how these IPR 
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enforcement actions affect the development of OSS. To address this question, it is useful 
to draw on theories on how the actions by proprietary holders of IPR can have 
implications for innovation under public domain (Heller and Eisenberg 1998, 
Gambardella and Hall 2006). However, most prior literature has focused on production of 
public knowledge goods such as scientific research (e.g., Walsh et al. 2003, Murray and 
Stern 2007, Walsh et al. 2007). There has been no systematic research examining the 
implications of formal IPR for the use and production of OSS, which might be different 
from other innovations under public domain in terms of the participation of commercial 
firms, greater market demand and commercial implications, and weaker reputation effects 
(von Hippel and von Krogh 2003, Gambardella and Hall 2006). 
 While no systematic research has quantified the effects of formal IPR on OSS, 
prior work (e.g., Cockburn and MacGarvie 2011) suggests that the existence of 
overlapping IPR, particularly patents (denoted as patent thickets), can create substantial 
costs for firms to commercialize software products in general. Several mechanisms 
promoting the sharing of collective IPR (i.e., patent pool, cross-licensing, standards-
setting organizations) have been suggested to ameliorate this concern (Shapiro 2001). It 
remains to explore what collective rights mechanisms could be effective within the OSS 
communities and how. For example, since 2005, an increasing number of patent-pledging 
events have been announced by large OSS-friendly incumbents such as IBM, Sun 
Microsystems, and Nokia. Moreover, a few royalty-free patent pools such as the Patent 
Commons and Open Invention Network were established within the OSS communities, 
representing a special type of institution that offers royalty-free usage of patents to any 
OSS firm that promises not to sue the pool’s beneficiaries (Lévêque and Ménière 2007, 
Serafino 2007, Hall and Helmers 2011). It is difficult to draw on the existing literature on 
traditional collective rights organization to evaluate the implications of those institutions. 
This is because prior studies have largely focused on institutions that delineate specific 
licensing rules and restrictions to outside members, whereas in this setting these 
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collective rights are royalty-free to any firm as long as it produces OSS. Thus, it is 
important to systematically investigate how such sharing and pledging of IPR affect OSS 
innovation.  
 My dissertation hopes to bridge these gaps in prior literature and takes the first 
step to study the implications of formal IPR for OSS. I particularly investigate the 
impacts of the following two types of IPR strategies exercised by incumbents: (i) IPR 
enforcement actions by incumbents, such as these lawsuits against a variety of OSS 
platforms as mentioned above, and (ii) the creation of royalty-free patent pools by OSS-
friendly incumbents, which arguably serve as a counter measure against those litigation 
attacks. In short, my dissertation asks: how do these incumbent IPR strategies affect the 
direction of OSS innovation? 
 More specifically, in the second chapter, I investigate how IPR enforcement 
actions exercised by proprietary IPR holders affect OSS project success. I focus on two 
key metrics of OSS success: user interest and developer activity. The main hypotheses of 
this chapter are built upon prior research on OSS user interest (e.g., Subramaniam et al. 
2009) and developer motivations (e.g., Lakhani and Wolf 2003, Roberts et al. 2006, 
Stewart et al. 2006). I argue that when an IPR enforcement action is filed, user interest 
and developer activity will be negatively affected in two types of OSS projects—those 
that have technology overlap with the litigated project and those that are intended for 
business and specific to a litigated OSS platform.   
 I test these hypotheses by examining how the filing of two widely publicized 
lawsuits—SCO v. IBM and FireStar/DataTern v. Red Hat—affected user interest and 
developer activity in these two types of projects. I use difference-in-difference estimation 
as the method of causal inference (Angrist and Pischke 2009) and extract data from the 
largest available repository of OSS projects—SourceForge.net (SourceForge) to 
empirically test the hypotheses. Following the existing literature (Subramaniam et al. 
2009, Chengalur-Smith et al. 2010), I use the number of project downloads as a proxy for 
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user interest and the number of closed artifacts as a proxy of developer activity. I find 
that in the months following the filing of SCO v. IBM, OSS projects that exhibit high 
technology overlap with the litigated OSS experienced a 15% greater decline in user 
interest and 60% greater decline in developer activity than projects in the control group; 
OSS projects that are intended for business and specific to a litigated OSS platform had a 
34% greater decline in user interest and 86% larger decrease in developer activity than 
the control group. I find similar results following the filing of FireStar/DataTern v. Red 
Hat. These results are also robust to a variety of robustness checks, including a 
falsification exercise and subsample analyses. 
 The negative effects of IPR enforcement on OSS use and production as identified 
in the second chapter provides some evidence that the “tragedy of the anti-commons” 
exists in the setting of OSS innovations. The third chapter investigates whether and how 
the creation and the size of a royalty-free OSS patent pool may positively encourage OSS 
innovation by mitigating the anti-commons problem. While OSS innovation can be 
examined from many different perspectives, my research strategy is to look at the impact 
of an OSS patent pool along a margin of innovation where it is likely to  have the 
strongest impact. Therefore, the research focus of this chapter is on the software product 
entry behavior by start-ups using an OSS license (denoted as OSS entry).   
 Following prior work by Llobet (2003) and Galasso and Schankerman (2010), I 
first develop a model that shows that increases in the size of the pool influence the 
outcome of the litigation game and consequently the start-up’s OSS entry decision. 
Comparative statics from the model show that (i) changes in the size of the OSS patent 
pool related to a software segment facilitates OSS entry by start-up firms into the same 
segment; and (ii) the marginal effect of the pool on OSS entry will be especially large in 
software segments where the cumulativeness of innovation is high or where patent 
ownership in a segment is concentrated. 
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 To empirically test these propositions, I focus on one major OSS patent pool—the 
Patent Commons—and assemble data on OSS entry using data on product releases from 
2,054 start-up software firms contained in the Gale database “PROMT”. Then I follow 
prior work (Cockburn and MacGarvie 2009, 2011) and allocate patents to software 
product market segments. This mapping is used to identify the number of pool patents 
related to each market segment, as well as the cumulativeness of innovation and patent 
ownership concentration in the segment. I employ count data conditional fixed effects 
models, so the empirical strategy is to look at whether time series variation in the size of 
the OSS patent pool related to a software segment is associated with changes in the 
number of OSS entrants into that segment.  
 The results from the third chapter suggest that a 10% increase in the size of an 
OSS patent pool related to a software segment is associated with a 1.5%-2.9% increase in 
the rate of OSS entry by start-ups into that segment. The marginal impact of the OSS 
patent pool is significantly greater in segments where the cumulativeness of innovation is 
high: a 10% increase in the size of an OSS patent pool is associated with a 3.8%-5.6% 
increase in the rate of OSS entry when the cumulativeness of innovation is at its 90th 
percentile, compared to no significant increase when cumulativeness is at its 10th 
percentile. The effect of OSS patents pools is also greater when the concentration of 
patent ownership is high. A 10% increase in the size of an OSS patent pool is associated 
with a 1.3%-1.7% increase when patent concentration is at its 90th percentile and no 
increase when patent concentration is at its 10th percentile, however the statistical 
significance of these results vary somewhat across specifications. I also explore the 




THE IMPACT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
ENFORCEMENT ON OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE PROJECT 
SUCCESS 
2.1 Introduction 
 Open source software (OSS) has seen increasing adoption and development by 
both organizations and individuals in recent years, and in some markets provides the 
infrastructure for a significant share of overall economic activity. For example, based on 
a survey by Netcraft, Apache and its derivatives had been adopted by 2.6 million newly 
established websites in October 2009 (Netcraft 2009). An increasing body of literature 
(see Feller et al. 2005, Lerner and Tirole 2005a, Maurer and Scotchmer 2006, and von 
Hippel 2006 for recent reviews) has emerged in information systems and other fields 
studying, among many other things, the incentives for user contributions (e.g., Lakhani 
and von Hippel 2003, Hann et al. 2004, Roberts et al. 2006), firm strategies in open 
source (e.g., West 2003, Henkel 2006), and the impact of licensing and legal regimes 
(e.g., Lerner and Tirole 2005b, Stewart et al. 2006).  
 Despite the increasing popularity of OSS, the success of OSS projects vary 
widely—most cease to have activity after the first year (Stewart et al. 2006). In response 
to this, many researchers have studied the factors associated with OSS project success 
(e.g. Grewal et al. 2006, Stewart et al. 2006, Chengalur-Smith et al. 2010). For example, 
a recent stream of studies has focused on the role of project characteristics such as the 
social network of developers (e.g. Grewal et al. 2006), project sponsorship (e.g. Stewart 
et al. 2006), and network social capital (Singh et al. 2011) on project success.  
 The success of OSS projects is likely to be further influenced by the behavior of 
market participants who do not employ the OSS model. The development of new 
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knowledge is commonly organized around two types of models. The first, the so-called 
“private investment” or “proprietary” model, uses private investment to fund new 
projects and formal and informal intellectual property rights (IPR) protection to 
appropriate the returns from these investments (von Hippel and von Krogh 2003, 
Gambardella and Hall 2006). In the second type of model—the so-called “public 
domain,” “collective action,” or “private-collective action” models like open source—
knowledge workers produce public goods that cannot be withheld from other users (e.g., 
von Hippel and von Krogh 2003). It has been widely theorized that actions by individuals 
and organizations using the first model can have implications for those using the second 
(Heller and Eisenberg 1998, Gambardella and Hall 2006). In particular, enforcement of 
formal IPR like patents may discourage production and use of public knowledge goods 
like OSS and may be another example of the “tragedy of the anti-commons” that has 
arisen in other collective action models such as scientific research (Gambardella and Hall 
2006).  
 While these ideas hold great salience for the success of OSS projects, they have to 
my knowledge not been systematically empirically tested. Recent research has explored 
the implications of the introduction of formal IPR on the production and use of 
knowledge in scientific research, demonstrating mixed results (e.g., Walsh et al. 2003, 
Murray and Stern 2007, Walsh et al. 2007). However, results for OSS may be different 
from these other contexts because of differences in institutional characteristics such as 
greater market demand, the presence of non-producing consumers, and weaker reputation 
effects (Gambardella and Hall 2006).  
 With these ideas in mind, I take a first step towards empirically assessing the 
implications of formal IPR for the production and use of OSS. I motivate my hypotheses 
using prior theoretical work that has demonstrated how the possession and exercise of 
formal IPR can lead to an under-provision of knowledge under the public domain model. 
Using prior research on OSS user interest (e.g., Subramaniam et al. 2009) and developer 
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motivations (e.g., Lakhani and Wolf 2003, Roberts et al. 2006, Stewart et al. 2006), as a 
starting point, I theorize the implications of formal IPR for two key metrics of OSS 
success: user interest and developer activity. I focus on the implications of IPR 
enforcement through litigation actions rather than the existence of formal IPR like patents 
or copyrights because the former provides a more proximate signal about the risks to 
users and developers. I next develop the main hypothesis of this study: I argue that when 
an IPR enforcement action is filed, user interest and developer activity will be 
particularly affected in two types of OSS projects—those that have technology overlap 
with the litigated project and those that are intended for business and specific to a 
litigated OSS platform.   
 I test these hypotheses by examining how the filing of two widely publicized 
lawsuits—SCO v. IBM and FireStar/DataTern v. Red Hat—affected user interest and 
developer activity in these two types of projects. My method of causal inference is 
difference-in-difference estimation (Angrist and Pischke 2009). I use data from the 
largest available repository of OSS projects—SourceForge.net (SourceForge). I first 
examine the implications for user interest by studying the impact of IPR enforcement 
actions on the number of project downloads. I find that in the months following the filing 
of SCO v. IBM, monthly downloads of OSS projects that display technology overlap with 
the focal litigated OSS fell 15%-16% relative to a control group, while those projects that 
are intended for business and specific to a litigated OSS platform fell 34%-35% more 
than other projects. I find similar results following the filing of FireStar/DataTern v. Red 
Hat. These results are robust to a large variety of analyses and additional tests.   
 I next examine the effects of the same IPR enforcement actions for developer 
activity. In keeping with prior literature (e.g., Chengalur-Smith et al. 2010), I use the 
number of closed artifacts in a project as a proxy. In the months following the filing of 
SCO v. IBM, the number of closed artifacts per month for projects that exhibit technology 
overlap with the litigated one fell 60.2%-63.8% more than the control group; business-
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related projects specific to the litigated platform also had 86%-87% fewer closed artifacts 
per month following the suit than the control group. I find similar results when I study the 
number of closed artifacts following the filing of FireStar/DataTern v. Red Hat. Once 
again, to address concerns about time-varying omitted variables, I further examine the 
robustness of these results using a series of additional tests. 
 As noted above, my research advances recent literature on the implications of 
formal IPR for the generation and use of new public good knowledge. However, my 
findings also have implications for other research areas. In particular, my research 
advances recent literature that has studied how outside factors such as the social network 
in which an OSS project is embedded (e.g., Grewal et al. 2006, Singh 2010) and the 
niche1 size in which a project operates (e.g. Chengalur-Smith et al. 2010) influence an 
OSS project’s likelihood of success. In particular, as suggested by Chengalur-Smith et al 
(2010), an individual project’s success is not only determined by the characteristics of the 
project but also by the characteristics of the project niche and its environmental process. I 
follow this line of research and stress the enforcement of IPR as one important 
environmental factor influencing OSS success.  
 Last, my study has important implications for the study of IPR in software. The 
validity and enforceability of software patents has become more certain in US law since 
1980, and individual and firm behavior has changed accordingly (Graham and Mowery 
2003). The increasing use of software patents has contributed to a concern about their 
detrimental effect on the development (Scotchmer 1991, Bessen and Maskin 2009) and 
adoption (Tucker 2012) of new software. Empirical work in this area has usually focused 
on the implications of IPR for the behavior of firms producing software under the 
proprietary model; in particular, one line of work has focused on the effects of formal 
                                                 
 
 
1 A niche is defined from the organizational ecology perspective as a set of organizations that have 
something in common (Chengalur-Smith et al. 2010). 
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IPR on new product entry by software firms (e.g., Cockburn and MacGarvie 2011). My 
study adds to this stream of literature by providing empirical evidence about the 
implications of IPR protection for software development activity under the OSS model 
(Samuelson et al. 1994, Cohen and Lemley 2001, Graham and Mowery 2005). 
2.2 Theoretical Motivation And Hypotheses 
 The design of systems to provide incentives for researchers and other knowledge 
producers has long been an active area of research (e.g., Scotchmer 1991). Scholars have 
described multiple regimes to allocate resources for the generation of new knowledge 
(e.g., von Hippel and von Krogh 2003). One system relies on private investment by 
individuals and organizations to produce private goods and knowledge. To provide 
appropriate incentives for private firms and individuals to invest, new knowledge 
produced under this system is often protected by traditional regimes of intellectual 
property protection like patents and copyrights. This regime has commonly been labeled 
the “private investment” or “proprietary research” model (e.g., von Hippel and von 
Krogh 2003, Gambardella and Hall 2006).  
 Under the second system, knowledge outputs are public goods; if any user 
consumes them, they cannot be withheld from other users (e.g., Olson 1971). In contrast 
to the private investment model, rewards under this model are provided indirectly 
through, for example, increased reputation, access to additional research resources, and 
potential subsequent financial returns in the form of salary, prizes, and so forth (e.g., 
Merton 1957, von Hippel and von Krogh 2003, Gambardella and Hall 2006). This model 
has alternatively been labeled the “open science”, “collective action”, or “public domain” 
model by researchers (Merton 1957, von Hippel and von Krogh 2003, Gambardella and 
Hall 2006). In its emphasis on the production of public goods and avoidance of the use of 
formal and informal appropriability mechanisms, this latter model shares many 
characteristics with the “private-collective action” model that has been used to describe 
 11
OSS development (von Hippel and von Krogh 2003). In keeping with prior work on OSS 
that motivates my research (Gambardell and Hall 2006) and my focus on differences in 
the use of appropriability mechanisms (such as patents and copyrights) across regimes, 
for the purposes of this discussion I group these two models together and label them the 
“public domain” model. 
 A long literature has explored how the introduction and enforcement of IPR under 
the proprietary model may promote the development and diffusion of knowledge under 
the public domain model. For example, patents may promote complementary investments 
by firms to commercialize new knowledge. The most common example of this is when 
scientific knowledge needs downstream investments to become commercial products 
(e.g., Thursby et al. 2001). Patents may also facilitate the effective functioning of markets 
for technology (e.g., Arora et al. 2001). In contrast, other research has emphasized how 
the introduction and enforcement of IPR increases the costs of using public knowledge 
that previously had been used freely. This view has been described as an “anti-commons” 
effect: since the imposition of formal IPR can exclude others from the use of new ideas, it 
can inhibit the cumulative nature of new knowledge production both by increasing the 
costs of using protected knowledge and the costs of building upon it (e.g., Heller and 
Eisenberg 1998).  
 Prior work that has evaluated the anti-commons effect in other settings has 
explored the implications of IPR both for the use of (previously public good) knowledge 
as well as the production of new knowledge (e.g., Walsh et al. 2003, Murray and Stern 
2007, Walsh et al. 2007). One theme from this literature is that the existence and exercise 
of IPR can increase the costs of using new knowledge inputs through the enforcement of 
licensing fees, terms of exclusivity, and infringement liability (e.g., Dasgupta and David 
1994, Walsh et al. 2007). The research of Gambardella and Hall (2006) suggests that the 
anti-commons effect may be particularly important in the context of OSS development, 
however they neither directly model nor test this hypothesis. I advance this prior work by 
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developing specific hypotheses about how IPR enforcement can influence user interest 
and developer activity in an OSS project. 
2.2.1 How Does IPR Enforcement Affect User Interest? 
 In this section, I investigate how IPR enforcement could affect the success of OSS 
projects in attracting user adoption (I label this as user interest). I focus on how an 
increase in the perceived costs to adoption through litigation risks translates into lower 
user interest (Stewart et al. 2006). I motivate this hypothesis through the technology 
adoption literature, particularly the Rank Approach described by Stoneman (2002). The 
rank approach asserts that an individual or organization will adopt a new technology (in 
my case, an OSS project) when the gross benefits to adoption exceed the costs.  
 Given the heterogeneity in OSS project characteristics, I expect differences across 
projects in the effects of IPR enforcement on user interest. In the remainder of this 
section, I describe the two types of projects for which user interest is likely to be 
particularly affected. 
How Does IPR Enforcement Affect User Interest In OSS Projects That Exhibit 
Technology Overlap With The Litigated Technology? 
 The litigation externalities literature (e.g., Viscusi and Hersch 1990, Govindaraj et 
al. 2007) suggests that given an enforcement action targeting a single firm, other firms in 
the same industry may incur significant capital losses if the enforcement matures into 
litigation. The reason is that investors and customers may “view lawsuits against any firm 
in an industry as likely to increase the likelihood that all firms in the industry will be 
implicated in future lawsuits” (Prince and Rubin 2002). In my setting, an IPR 
enforcement action against the focal OSS could influence a user’s perception of whether 
similar OSS projects will become targets in the future. If this happens, a potential user 
would anticipate an increase in associated costs (e.g., anticipated royalties demanded by 
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IPR holders2 , direct litigation costs3) that would reduce her overall utility from adopting 
software from the project. In fact, adopters have been defendants in several prominent 
OSS cases (e.g., SCO v. DaimlerChrysler and SCO v. AutoZone).  
 When a potential user assesses whether her intended OSS project will be affected, 
she will use cues such as the software’s observable attributes to assess the likelihood of 
infringement risk. This is because software is a complex technology consisting of many 
independently protectable inventions. The existence of many anonymous developers in 
the OSS community makes it difficult to identify the provenance of the code and 
therefore assess the infringement risks (Lerner and Tirole 2005a).  
 Here I focus on one software attribute that serves as a cue for potential users to 
determine whether expected costs will increase as a result of a litigation event: 
technology overlap with the focal litigated technology. Following existing literature, 
technology overlap is considered to be high when two technologies draw from related 
technological areas (e.g., Lanjouw and Schankerman 2001). Technology overlap will 
generally be higher when new inventions combine existing conceptual materials such as 
routines or technologies (Nelson and Winter 1982) or constituents of invention along the 
lines of what Schumpeter calls “factors” (Schumpeter 1939, Fleming 2001). In computer 
                                                 
 
 
2 For example, following the initiation of the SCO v. IBM case, SCO sent notices to over 1,500 corporate 
Linux users, requesting a roughly $700-per-server license fee and stating that those refusing this offer could 
face litigation (Goettsch 2004). Royalty payments often arise from negotiations between a patentee and 
alleged infringer. For example, Red Hat set aside $43 million for the settlement of IPR litigation claims 
related to JBoss (Mueller 2011)) 
3 IPR enforcement actions seldom mature into litigation, and more likely settle with a royalty payment by 
the accused infringer to the IPR owner (Farrell and Merges 2004). The high cost of IPR litigation—
estimated for patent suits to average between $0.7-5.5 million per side—are a major determinant to 
settlement, even when the royalty demanded is out of proportion to the incremental value of the 
technological contribution. But the enforcement stance of the IPR owner can nevertheless drive the accused 
infringer to suffer these litigation costs. Courts will often use injunctions to prevent accused infringers from 
conducting any business that uses the patented technology (Lanjouw and Lerner 2001), thus forcing 
production lines to close or products to be removed from store shelves (Graham and Mowery 2003). This 
business risk, when coupled with high litigation costs, can drive accused infringers to settle on unfavorable 
royalty terms, thus driving up costs associated with IPR enforcement actions for adopters. 
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software, programmers can combine existing factors such as algorithms, methods, or 
specific lines of code. While technology overlap can be assessed for proprietary 
technologies through the use of bibliometric information in patents (e.g., Fleming 2001), 
in my setting potential users can assess technology overlap between two OSS projects by 
investigating project descriptions, key words, and documentation.  
 I argue that potential users will perceive higher potential litigation costs for 
projects with greater technology overlap. As a result, they may choose not to adopt. 
There are at least three reasons for why the perceived litigation risks may be higher for 
this group. First, OSS developers reuse knowledge and code extensively in order to 
efficiently integrate functionalities and reduce development costs (Haefliger et al. 2008). 
When the technology overlap between two OSS projects is high, it is even more likely 
that developers will reuse knowledge from the other project since technology reuse is 
most effective when developers are searching in a set of familiar components (Fleming 
2001). Therefore, such projects will be more likely to have infringing code and for the 
use of infringing code to be identified. Further, because IPR enforcement strategies are 
commonly run in series, with early cases being used to build findings and evidence for 
later enforcement actions against others, the logic of transaction costs suggests that 
software with characteristics similar to the focal target would be more prone to 
subsequent enforcement. Moreover, IPR owners may have incentives to signal to a group 
of similar projects the intention to enforce their property rights so as to build a reputation 
for aggressive IPR protection (Lanjouw and Schankerman 2001) and I suggest that such a 
reputation would be most valuable in a technologically proximate space to the IPR 
holders’ assets. Therefore, I argue an IPR rights holder is more likely to first target OSS 
projects in fields that display technology overlap.  
 Simply put, in the wake of an IPR enforcement action against a particular piece of 
OSS, potential adopters of OSS projects that overlap with the technology of the focal 
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litigated OSS may perceive an increase in the expected costs of use. Thus, I expect all 
else equal that enforcement of IPR will decrease a user’s interest in these projects4.  
H1: IPR enforcement has a negative impact on user interest in OSS projects that have 
technology overlap with the focal litigated OSS. 
How Does IPR Enforcement Affect User Interest In OSS Projects Specific To A 
Litigated Platform? 
 Investments by buyers and sellers in computer software often take place within 
the context of platforms: a set of interchangeable IT components that enable buyers and 
sellers to coordinate on the same technological advancement (Bresnahan and Greenstein 
1999). As has been highlighted elsewhere, the OSS development methodology can have 
significant advantages for the creation and dissemination of platforms. The provision of 
complementary applications specific to a platform5 is often controlled by formal, 
published interfaces that are proprietary. In contrast, in OSS third-party developers can 
add their own interfaces unanticipated by the original authors of the platform (West 
2003). This can increase incentives for third-party development. Thus, many large and 
important OSS projects serve as platforms. This includes operating system projects like 
Linux as well as many other projects like Apache or Red Hat’s JBoss enterprise 
middleware. 
 A large body of economic theory has emerged to explain buyer and seller 
behavior within the context of platforms. A central idea in much of this work is to explain 
the persistence of standards, which stand at the heart of computer platforms. Bresnahan 
                                                 
 
 
4 I note the possibility that some users may switch from the focal (litigated) project into alternative goods 
with similar features. In that sense, my results can be viewed as an upper bound (i.e., conservative) estimate 
of how the costs of litigation influence user behavior. 
5 For simplicity, sometimes I denote those complementary applications that are specific to a platform as 
platform-specific software. 
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and Greenstein (1999) detail how the theory of standards makes two assumptions about 
buyer and seller behavior. First, buyers and sellers of IT make platform-specific 
investments. Second, some of these platform-specific investments are long-lived: in 
particular, they influence the future market choices available to buyers. These 
assumptions imply that buyers of computer software frequently make long-lived 
platform-specific investments that tend to sustain platforms for long periods. This will 
particularly be the case for computer software investments made by businesses, where the 
need to coordinate investment activity over time is greatest (Bresnahan and Greenstein 
1996, 1999).  
 Prior work has demonstrated that when the costs of these long-lived platform-
specific investments are high, buyers will delay adoption of both the platform and 
complementary software specific to the platform (Forman 2005). Further, the extent of 
delay is likely to be magnified when there exists uncertainty surrounding the potential 
success of the platform. In the presence of such uncertainty, buyers may delay adoption 
of the platform and complementary software until the uncertainty is resolved. If IPR 
enforcement targets a platform, it could therefore increase uncertainty surrounding the 
success of the platform and therefore delay adoption of both the platform and all 
platform-specific software. 
 This is particularly true because of the importance of network effects to platforms. 
Successful platforms require a critical mass of adopters and complementary software 
specific to the platforms. In the presence of positive feedback, platforms must get ‘over 
the hump’ to become a new standard (e.g., Bresnahan and Greenstein 1999, Farrell and 
Klemperer 2007). Legal actions that increase uncertainty about the future viability of the 
platform will make it that much more difficult for the platform to get ‘over the hump’, 
experience increasing returns to adoption, and survive. This will make potential buyers 
more reticent to make long-lived platform-specific investments.  
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 Thus, IPR enforcement actions that target an OSS platform will likely have a 
negative impact on software projects that are specific to the platform, typically those for 
which software investments require long-lived investments as is the case for business 
software.  
H2: IPR enforcement has a negative impact on the user interest in business-related OSS 
projects that are specific to a focal litigated OSS platform. 
2.2.2 How Does IPR Enforcement Affect Developer Activity? 
 In this section, I investigate for what types of projects IPR enforcement is likely 
to influence developer activity. A body of OSS literature highlights how intrinsic 
motivation and extrinsic motivations influence developers to participate in OSS projects 
(e.g. Lakhani and Wolf 2003, Roberts et al. 2006). Developers driven by intrinsic 
motivations participate for the pure enjoyment of coding (Roberts et al. 2006), sharing, 
and the free and open software ideology (Shah 2006). On the contrary, developers driven 
by extrinsic motivation participate more for its instrumental value (Ryan and Deci 2000): 
developers choose to participate only if the expected benefits are greater than the costs 
(e.g. the opportunity costs of their time) (Lerner and Tirole 2002). This latter set of 
motivations can further be classified into the benefits of direct monetary compensation; 
utility-based need for particular software; ego enhancement or peer recognition; career 
concern or skill improvement; potential commercialization interest or access to venture 
capital (Maurer and Scotchmer 2006).   
 I build upon prior literature that studies developer motivations by studying how 
differences in project characteristics influence extrinsic motivations through the costs and 
benefits of contributing (e.g., Lerner and Tirole 2002, 2005a, Gambardella and Hall 2006, 
Stewart et al. 2006). Namely, in parallel to the development of Hypotheses 1 and 2, I 
study how IPR enforcement actions affect the costs and benefits of developer motivations 
for projects that (1) show technology overlap with a litigated project or that (2) are 
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business applications specific to a litigated OSS platform. I focus on three implications of 
IPR enforcement for these two groups: (1) the costs of participating in the project; (2) the 
benefits of contributing to the project for self-use; and (3) the career-related benefits of 
contributing to OSS projects.  
 In the wake of IPR enforcement, developers’ costs of participating in projects 
with technology overlap with the litigated one will increase. As noted above, such 
projects will commonly share code with the litigated project. IPR enforcement actions 
may therefore force developers working on those projects to spend additional effort to 
identify and search for the provenance of code and attest that they have the right to use a 
particular piece of code in the project (Lerner and Tirole 2005a).  
 IPR enforcement actions will also affect the benefits of contributing to these two 
types of projects. For one, a common reason that developers contribute to a project is to 
use the product they develop (e.g., von Hippel and von Krogh 2003, Stewart et al. 2006). 
Thus, developer activity and user interest are frequently correlated (Krishnamurthy 
2002). As noted above, IPR enforcement actions will reduce user interests in these two 
types of projects, and so will similarly mute development incentives.  
 Further, developers who work on OSS projects for career-related signaling 
concerns will prefer to work on projects with a greater user base (Lerner and Tirole 
2002). Greater user interest will translate into a wider audience for contributors that will 
make their efforts more visible (Parker and van Alstyne 2005). Thus, there are greater 
reputation benefits from working on popular projects (Lerner and Tirole 2002). If user 
interest declines as hypothesized in H1 and H2, this will lead to a similar decline in 
developer incentives. Similarly, many developers are employed by firms attempting to 
commercialize OSS projects (e.g., Lerner and Tirole 2002, 2005a). If user interest in 
these two types of projects decline, then commercialization and other indirect profit 
opportunities from these projects will decline as well.  Weakening firm sponsorship in the 
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project and support for developers may lead to a decline in developer activity. These 
discussions lead to the following hypotheses: 
H3: IPR enforcement has a negative impact on developer activity in OSS projects that 
have technology overlap with the focal litigated OSS. 
H4: IPR enforcement has a negative impact on developer activity in business-related OSS 
projects that are specific to a focal litigated OSS platform. 
2.3 Econometric Approach 
 The method of causal inference I use is difference-in-difference estimation 
(Angrist and Pischke 2009). The basic idea of difference-in-difference estimation is to 
examine a set of treated units before and after the treatment (in this case, an IPR 
enforcement action). In my setting, the treated units are those OSS projects that show 
technology overlap with the litigated OSS or belong to business-related OSS projects 
specific to a litigated OSS platform. Difference-in-difference estimation has been used 
frequently in the IS literature as a method of causal inference, particularly in 
circumstances where I wish to examine how an exogenous event such as new firm entry 
(Forman et al. 2009), new movie broadcast (Smith and Telang 2009), or legal action 
(Tucker 2012) influences economic behavior such as purchase decisions. Difference-in-
difference has also frequently been used in the literature evaluating the implications of 
IPR for production and use of knowledge under the collective action model (e.g., Murray 
and Stern 2007, 2008, Thompson et al. 2011). As in those papers and more broadly 
within the difference-in-difference approach, I used revealed preferences to test 
hypotheses. That is, I do not directly observe how the costs and benefits of OSS use and 
OSS development activity change after the litigation event. Instead, I use changes in use 
and development activity to infer that the net benefits from participating in these 
activities have changed. My use of difference-in-difference estimation requires me to 
estimate separate regression models for user interest and developer activity.  
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 Indexing units by i and time by t, I adopt the basic form:  
Outcomeit = α + δ TreatmentGroupi + β0 AfterTreatmentt + β TreatmentGroupi* 
AfterTreatmentt + γ  RegressionControlsit + εit 
(2.1) 
 By plugging in zeros and ones for the binary variables in equation (2.1), the 
difference across groups in the before and after treatment is β. If β is negative, the 
treatment can be interpreted as having a negative effect on the outcome. Just as in a true 
experiment, this approach means that I can see whether behavior in the treatment group 
changes differently from that in the control group. In my setting, I examine the before 
and after performance of two treatment groups—OSS projects that show technology 
overlap with the litigated projects and business OSS projects that are specific to a 
litigated OSS platform. 
 I note that the parameter β0 may also be of interest. That is, β0 captures changes in 
user interest or developer activity across all projects after IPR enforcement. However, β0 
may also reflect general time trends in user interest or developer activity (for example, 
because of some seasonality effect) and so in the absence of a control group it is difficult 
to identify the effects of the treatment from alternative time-varying factors. While I 
report estimates for β0, I do not focus on them. In the next several sections I describe the 
treatment, how I identify the treatment groups, my regression controls, and several 
additional details about my experiment. 
2.3.1 Cases of IPR Enforcement: The Treatment 
 I choose well-publicized lawsuits as cases of IPR enforcement. Based on a search 





Table 2.1 Summary of Cases 




Technologies in dispute 
1 SCO IBM 3/7/2003 N/A Copyright Linux operating system 
2 FireStar and 
DataTern 
Red Hat 6/26/2006 6/11/2008 Patent A method of interfacing an object-oriented 
software application with a relational database 
3 NetApp Sun 9/5/2007 N/A Patent 7 patents related to NetApp’s WAFL and 
RAID technology 
4 IP innovation Red Hat and 
Novell 
10/15/2007 N/A Patent 3 US patents covering the user interface in 
multiple workspaces sharing display system 
objects 
5 Microsoft TomTom 2/25/2009 3/30/2009 Patent Five patents related to car navigation 
technology and three for file management 
systems 
6 Software Tree Red Hat, HP, 
Genuitec, and 
Dell 
3/3/2009 N/A Patent A System and Method for Exchanging Data 
and Commands Between an Object Oriented 
System and Relational System. 
Note: 1) Based on a search of major news outlets, I found six large, well-publicized lawsuits as cases of IPR enforcement against open source software and 
summarize them in the following table. The main reason for me not to focus on case 3 and case 4 lies in that case 4 was filed only one month after case 3 and 
thus it is difficult to disentangle potential adopters’ behavioral changes in response to case 3 from their reactions to case 4. I do not choose case 5 and case 6 also 
for the same reason. Meanwhile, for case 5, the time window between filing date and settlement date is very short, so it is difficult to identify any behavioral 




 While many papers implementing difference-in-difference estimation examine the 
implications of one treatment only, I choose to examine the implications of two 
treatments to improve the internal validity of my study (i.e., by showing my results hold 
in multiple contexts, this provides further confidence that my results do not reflect 
unobserved factors influencing the outcome of the treatment group) and its external 
validity (to suggest that my results reflect more than the outcomes around a particular 
IPR enforcement case). In particular, I focus on the initial announcements of two 
lawsuits: SCO v. IBM and FireStar/DataTern v. Red Hat.  
 My choice of lawsuits is guided by several factors. First, I hope to choose lawsuits 
that were contemporaneously viewed as economically important. These two cases have 
had wide news coverage6 and also the defendants in both cases are commercial players 
that have significant capital investments in OSS. Second, my approach requires that the 
open source community not be aware of the risks of litigation ex ante (otherwise they will 
have made the behavioral adjustments that I posit in advance of the IPR enforcement 
announcement). As a result of this requirement, I do not examine any of the numerous 
follow-on announcements and lawsuits that followed the SCO v. IBM case. Last, I 
exclude cases for which the time between the filing of the IPR enforcement action and 
the settlement of the case was too short to observe any significant behavioral changes. 
Case 1: SCO v. IBM (March 7, 2003) 
 On March 7, 2003, SCO filed a $1 billion lawsuit against IBM. SCO asserted it 
had ownership of Unix and all of its derivative works, and some of its copyrighted Unix 
software was wrongly copied into Linux by IBM (SCO 2003). The lawsuit attracted 
                                                 
 
 
6 By wide news coverage, I mean that many news outlets reported on the lawsuits. 
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significant publicity, partly because it was the first major IPR enforcement suit targeting 
OSS usage and development and partly because it related to Linux platform and so had 
important implications for the entire Linux ecosystem. Based on a Lexis-Nexis search I 
found that many major news outlets such as the Wall Street Journal, the San Jose 
Mercury News (San Jose, California), the Boston Globe, the Los Angeles Times, the 
Daily Telegraph (Sydney, Australia), and the Business Times (Singapore) all reported on 
this lawsuit around the filing date. 
Case 2: FireStar/DataTern v. Red Hat (June 26, 2006) 
 The second major case, FireStar/DataTern v. Red Hat, is related to the JBoss 
Platform, the most popular Java Enterprise Edition-based platform that has attracted more 
than 600 certified ISV applications as of 2012 (Stevens 2012). On June 26, 2006, FireStar 
and DataTern filed a lawsuit asserting that Red Hat’s JBoss suite – particularly Hibernate 
3.0 – infringes FireStar’s U.S. Patent No. 6,101,502. This patent details a method of 
interfacing an object-oriented software application with a relational database (Heubner et 
al. 2000). As many OSS observers noted, this lawsuit “is expected to take center stage on 
the legal front as SCO’s copyright claims against IBM fade” and “is potentially more 
significant than the SCO case because it’s about a patent that covers a basic concept or 
idea, not an expression of an idea, which copyright covers” (Rooney 2006). In the week 
following the lawsuit, Red Hat’s stock fell substantially and closed at $23.20 on July 3 




 My primary data source is the SourceForge Research Data Archive (SRDA) (Van 
Antwerp and Madey 2008), which receives monthly database snapshots from 
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SourceForge. SourceForge is the largest repository of OSS—over 230,000 projects and 
over 3 million users and developers were registered at the time of my data collection 
(SourceForge 2009). SRDA provides more complete data on a monthly than on a weekly 
basis so I use project-month as my unit of analysis.  
 The sampling period for SCO v. IBM is from January 2002 to July 2003, with 14 
months before SCO v. IBM and 5 months after. My choice of time window was 
influenced by several considerations. First, the extended period helps me to control for 
yearly and monthly time effects, in particular seasonality that may influence user and 
developer activity. Second, I choose 5 months after the lawsuit because another case was 
filed in August 2003, Red Hat v. SCO, that may shift how users and developers perceive 
the costs and benefits of interacting with OSS projects.7 The sampling period for 
FireStar/DataTern v. Red Hat is from July 2005 to November 2006, with 12 months 
before FireStar/DataTern v. Red Hat and 5 months after. Because of constraints 
associated with my data source, I am not able to get data before July 2005. Also, I believe 
the window size of 5 months for SCO v. IBM and FireStar/DataTern v. Red Hat is long 
enough for me to capture the post-IPR enforcement reaction from the OSS community. I 
have experimented with changing the sampling periods and my results were robust to 
these changes. 
 I first construct my samples to test the implications of IPR enforcement for user 
interest. As noted by Rainer and Gale (2005) and Hahn et al. (2008), many registered 
OSS projects on SourceForge are “impulse” projects. For example, such projects may be 
final student projects or the results of developer experimentation. The quality of these 
projects is relatively low, so such projects are unlikely to reflect the tradeoffs in which I 
                                                 
 
 
7 On August 4 2003, Red Hat, a major Linux distributor, filed a lawsuit against SCO, asserting that it was 
making “unfair, untrue and deceptive claims that Red Hat’s version of the open-source system contains 
code stolen from SCO” (Takahashi 2003) 
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am interested. To mitigate this problem and focus on active projects, I construct a 
baseline sample composed of projects that have positive downloads for each month 
during the sample.8 The resulting panels have 3,928 OSS projects over 19 months for 
SCO v. IBM and 24,301 projects over 17 months for FireStar/DataTern v. Red Hat.  
 To examine how IPR enforcement affects developer activity, I first restrict my 
sample to projects that have total number of closed artifacts larger than zero over the 
sample period. I then further restrict this sample by only including projects above the 
25th percentile of the distribution of total number of closed artifacts. This selection 
criterion is in line with other papers on developer activity suggesting that projects with 
very few artifacts may not have an active developer community and that the project’s 
purpose is primarily to make existing source code public (rather than providing a forum 
for new contributions) (Chengalur-Smith et al. 2010)9.  This rule results in a panel of 904 
OSS projects over 19 months for SCO v. IBM and a panel of 2,311 projects over 17 
months for FireStar/DataTern v. Red Hat. 
2.4.2 Variables 
 In the following subsections I describe my dependent and independent variables. 
Summary statistics for all variables in the baseline sample are shown in the below table 
2.2. 
  
                                                 
 
 
8 I also constructed an alternative sample using projects that have positive downloads for at least one month 
during the sample period. The results are qualitatively similar to those using the baseline sample. 
9 I constructed an alternative sample using projects that have total number of closed artifacts over the 
sample period larger than zero. As shown in the Appendix, the results from this alternative sample are very 
consistent with those using the baseline sample. 
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Table 2.2 Summary Statistics, Chapter 2 
  Variable Mean Std Dev. Min Max Obs 







1 1120505 74632 
developers 3.754 5.613 1 132 74632 
cvs_commits 25.811 118.478 0 5169 74632 
Project-
level  
Linux_kernel .017 .128 0 1 3928 
business_app_on_Linux .004 .066 0 1 3928 
installed_base 6.762 2.786 0 15.140 3928 
restrictive_license .707 .455 0 1 3928 





closed_artifacts 5.437 20.884 0 962 16272 
msg_posted 14.154 103.454 0 4375 16272 
Project-
level 
Linux_kernel .023 .151 0 1 904 
business_app_on_Linux .002 .047 0 1 904 
installed_base 8.224 2.020 3.4 15.14 904 
restrictive_license .645 .479 0 1 904 
FireStar/Data 





downloads 1672.329 45668 1 8447172 413117 
developers 2.992 5.784 0 350 413117 
new_files .304 3.720 0 775 413117 
Project-
level 
object_relational .002 .042 0 1 24301 
JBoss_related .001 .037 0 1 24301 
installed_base 7.099 2.108 .690 18.420 24301 
restrictive_license .111 .314 0 1 24301 
FireStar/Data 






closed_artifacts 3.600 15.584 0 839 36976 
msg_posted 409.916 2259.681 0 68131 36976 
Project-
level 
object_relational .002 .041 0 1 2311 
JBoss_related .002 .046 0 1 2311 
installed_base 8.640 2.473 2.7 17.58 2311 
restrictive_license .673 .469 0 1 2311 
Notes: Number of observations differs across IPR enforcement actions. Variables with the label “Project-
month-level” vary by project month, while those with the label “Project-level” vary only by project. 





2.4.2.1 Dependent Variables 
 User Interest. I follow prior literature in using downloads as a market-based 
measure of popularity and user interest (e.g., Grewal et al. 2006, Subramaniam et al. 
2009). As Grewal et al. (2006) note, when software projects are freely available, 
researchers have in the past used downloads as proxy for sales (e.g., Chandrashekaran et 
al. 1999). Monthly downloads may deviate from adoption, however. Some potential users 
may download OSS without using it. Further, some fraction of downloads are from OSS 
hobbyists who are interested simply in looking at the source code and do not plan to 
adopt the software. 10 While I acknowledge these concerns, I believe they may be less 
important for inference in my setting for several reasons. In contrast to some prior work 
on open source project success that focuses on cross sectional variance in project 
characteristics such as license choice, my focus is on within-project variance over time 
due to IPR enforcement actions. That is, I include a complete set of project fixed effects 
to address average differences in the number of downloads across projects. Second, I 
treat deviance of downloads from adoption as an error in my dependent variable that can 
be addressed through my use of robust standard errors (Wooldridge 2002); this will affect 
the consistency of my parameter estimates only if this deviance changes systematically 
over time in a way that is correlated with my treatment.  
 Developer Activity. As noted above, my interest is in identifying the effects of 
IPR enforcement on the costs and benefits to developers of making contributions to an 
OSS project. I use the number of closed artifacts for a project in a month to measure this 
variable. Closed artifacts measure how successfully developers complete requests for 
new features, patches, and bug fixes (Chengalur-Smith et al. 2010). This measure is 
                                                 
 
 
10 I also note that I do not distinguish between adopters who are first-time adopters of OSS and those who 
are existing users who are adopting a new version that may be available. I believe that the mechanism I 
describe will influence adoption by both of these groups.  
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consistent with past work that uses task completion to measure the amount of effort 
exerted by developers on a project (Herbsleb and Mockus 2003, Stewart and Gosain 
2006). While developer activity on a project can be measured in many different ways 
(Comino et al. 2007)—such as number of bugs fixed, CVS commits, or files released to 
the community—I believe that using closed artifacts is more appropriate in my setting for 
several reasons. First, new file releases happen infrequently, so this variable will vary 
little month-to-month.11  Second, I do not have monthly data on the number of CVS 
commits during the sample used for the FireStar/DataTern v. Red Hat case. Third, 
compared with other measures of developer activity, closed artifacts captures how 
developers respond to OSS user requests (Grewal et al. 2006). Because one major 
argument in my hypothesis development is that developer activity is influenced by IPR 
enforcement through the reduced user interest, I believe using closed artifacts provide the 
best lens for me to test this hypothesis. 
2.4.2.2 Independent Variables 
 IPR Enforcement. I construct a dummy variable labeled lawsuit that indicates 
whether an IPR infringement lawsuit has been filed. For SCO v. IBM, it is equal to 1 for 
observations between March 2003 and July 2003 and 0 otherwise. For FireStar/DataTern 
v. Red Hat, it is equal to 1 for observations between July 2006 and November 2006 and 0 
otherwise.  
 Overlap between OSS and the Focal Litigated Technology. This variable indicates 
whether the OSS project overlap with the technology of the focal litigated project. For 
SCO v. IBM, SCO asserted that IBM was misappropriating and wrongly incorporating its 
copyrighted Unix code into Linux (SCO 2003). Therefore, the technology of the focal 
                                                 
 
 
11 During the sample new files are released every seven to nine months. 
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litigated project in SCO v. IBM is the Linux operating system. The central part of the 
Linux operating system is called the Linux kernel, whose role is to give programs access 
to resources such as hard disk storage and random access memory (Hertel et al. 2003). 
Although a variety of distributors such as IBM and Red Hat integrate the Linux kernel 
into their own products to provide enhanced functions, the Linux kernel is an essential 
part of any type of Linux distribution and contains the potentially infringing code 
targeted by SCO. As noted by Al Gillen, vice president of system software research at 
IDC in Framingham, Mass, “SCO feels that the offending code is now so interspersed 
with the 2.4 and 2.5 [Linux] kernels that it will be impossible to effectively remove it. 
They believe the only way for it to be rectified is to go back to the 2.2 kernel and start all 
over again from there, and that is never going to happen” (McMillan 2003). Thus, I 
believe Linux kernel projects available on SourceForge will overlap with the technology 
of the litigated project. I generate a dummy variable “Linux_kernel” that is equal to 1 for 
Linux kernel projects and 0 otherwise. Details on how I identify Linux kernel projects are 
included in Appendix A.  
 For FireStar/DataTern v. Red Hat, the allegedly infringed patent (No. 6,101,502) 
describes a method of interfacing an object-oriented software application with a relational 
database. The focal litigated technology is in Red Hat’s JBoss suite—particularly 
Hibernate 3.0’s object-relational mapping technology, which concerns a model for 
“employing a relational database with object oriented software” (Sanders 2006). I 
construct a variable “object_relational” that is equal to one for projects that provide 
object-relational mapping technology. Additional details are provided in Appendix A.  
 Business Projects Specific to the Focal Litigated Platform. This variable indicates 
whether the OSS project is intended for a business audience and is specific to a litigated 
platform. For SCO v. IBM, the platform in question is the Linux operating system. As 
noted in the theory development preceding H2, the role of platform-specific investments 
is most significant for firms, so I focus here primarily on business-related OSS projects 
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that are used in conjunction with Linux. That is to say, since the unavailability of the 
Linux operating system would significantly decrease the value of organizational 
applications running on Linux, I identify the treatment group called 
“business_app_on_Linux” as the set of business applications running on Linux. The 
importance of such software has been growing over time; for example, one recent report 
estimates that total spending in support of business application software running on Linux 
exceeded $2 billion in 2008 (Gillen 2009). Further, business applications processing has 
accounted for an increasing share of Linux operating environment workload: by one 
estimate, enterprise applications such as ERP and CRM accounted for a 9% share of 
Linux operating environment workload in 2007 (compared with a 3.3% share in 2000) 
(Gillen 2009). More details on how to construct this variable are provided in Appendix A.  
 For FireStar/DataTern v. Red Hat, as noted above, JBoss software forms a 
platform on which other parties can build enhancements. Thus, my treatment group is the 
set of projects that are developed specifically for running on JBoss. Meanwhile, given 
that JBoss itself is intended for enterprise, I believe the intended audience for projects 
specific to JBoss is also firms. I further confirm this conjecture through close 
examination of each project’s descriptionllow prior literature in using downloads as a 
market-based measure of popularity 
2.4.2.3 Control Variables 
 Time-invariant controls. I include controls for preexisting installed based and 
project license type, two variables that have been shown in prior work to shape OSS 
project success (e.g. Subramaniam et al. 2009). My use of project-level fixed effects will 
cause these variables to be dropped in any regression as they are perfectly collinear with 
the fixed effects (Wooldridge 2002). As a result, I set these variables to zero before the 
IPR enforcement lawsuits; coefficients on these variables should be interpreted as 
 31
capturing how changes in the mean growth rate of user and developer activity post-
enforcement are affected by these variables.  
 Preexisting Installed Base. Adopters’ reaction to IPR enforcement may differ 
with the installed base of the project. To control for these effects, I measure each 
project’s preexisting installed base using its accumulated downloads on SourceForge two 
months before the start of the sample period. I further take the log of this variable to 
reduce its skewness.  
 Project License Type. As noted above, a body of literature has suggested that the 
restrictiveness of OSS licenses could affect user interest and developer activity. I follow 
the literature (e.g. Lerner and Tirole 2005b, Stewart et al. 2006, Subramaniam et al. 2009) 
to use a dummy (denoted as restrictive_license) to indicate whether an OSS project is 
distributed under highly restrictive license (i.e. GNU General Public License or GPL). If 
it is distributed under GPL, I set the value of restrictive_license to be 1, otherwise to be 0. 
 Time-varying controls. I also control for a variety of time-varying factors that 
may affect user and developer activity. Because these variables may themselves be 
endogenous, I run my regressions with and without them for robustness. Further, I 
include different sets of controls in the user interest and developer activity regressions to 
mitigate concerns that some controls may be endogenous in some regressions. For 
example, I do not control for CVS commits in the developer activity regressions since 
common unobserved factors are likely to drive both CVS commits and closed artifacts. 
 Time-Varying Controls Related to User Interest. It is possible that the incidence 
of my treatments may be correlated with some other time-varying omitted factors that 
may also be correlated with changes in downloads over time. One such omitted variable 
could be time-varying improvements in the quality of the software. To address this 
concern, I control for the number of developers, as increases in the number of software 
developers may be correlated with quality of software (Mishra et al. 2002). I also add the 
monthly CVS commits (denoted as cvs_commits) for the SCO v. IBM case as an indicator 
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of successful technical refinements in each month, since a “commit occurs when a 
developer uploads the altered source code file, which reflects meaningful contributions to 
the source code” (Grewal et al. 2006). Unfortunately, as mentioned above, data on the 
cvs_commits for the complete sample period defined by FireStar/DataTern v. Red Hat 
case is unavailable to us. Therefore, I add the number of new versions released every 
month (denoted as new_files) as an alternative control for this case.  
 Time-varying Controls Related to Developer Activity. As suggested by Crowston 
et al. (2003), lead users’ involvement in discussions and bug reporting could affect 
project success. Thus, I add the number of messages posted for each project in each 
month as a time-varying control. 
2.5 Empirical Models And Results 
2.5.1 Baseline Analyses For User Interest 
 To test my two hypotheses for user interest, I update equation (2.1) using the 
treatment, treatment groups, and regression controls defined above.12 I tested the impacts 
of the two cases of IPR enforcement (SCO v. IBM and FireStar/DataTern v. Red Hat) in 
separate analyses (rather than in one pooled regression) for two reasons. First, because of 
data constraints, I have missing observations for several months between 2003 (when the 
SCO v. IBM case was filed) and 2006 (when the FireStar/DataTern v. Red Hat case was 
filed). Thus, it is difficult to combine the two samples and jointly test the impacts of the 
two cases using one empirical model. Further, my approach of using separate regressions 
for each IPR enforcement action allows for additional flexibility in how each of my 
independent variables influence downloads. That is, my estimation strategy does not 
                                                 
 
 
12 I also tried to test each hypothesis separately (i.e. impacts on each treated group) and the results are 
qualitatively similar. Due to the limited space, I only present the empirical specifications testing H1 and H2 
together. 
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impose additional constraints on how variables like installed_base, new_files, and 
cvs_commits influence downloads. The main specifications are as follows. 
SCO v. IBM: log (downloadsit) = α + β0 lawsuitt + β1 lawsuitt*Linux_kerneli + β2 
lawsuitt* business_app_on_Linuxi + γ1 installed_baseit + γ2 
restrictive_licenseit+γ3cvs_commitsit +γ4developersit + γ5 year2003t +γ6 month-of-yeart 





FireStar/DataTern v. Red Hat: log (downloadsit) = α + β0 lawsuitt + β1 lawsuitt* 
object_relationali + β2 lawsuitt* JBoss_relatedi+γ1 installed_baseit+γ2 





 There are several things to note about equations (2.2) and (2.3). First, I employ 
fixed effects models in all of my analyses; these fixed effects will control for time-
invariant differences (i.e. vi) in the average number of downloads across projects.  
Second, I use robust standard errors in all regressions, clustered at the project level, as 
recommended by Bertrand et al. (2004). Third, for SCO v. IBM, I include a year dummy 
(i.e. year2003) and 11 month-of-year dummies (i.e., February, …, December) to control 
for time and seasonality trends in adoption. For FireStar/DataTern v. Red Hat, I do not 
include these time effects because of insufficient variance in my data source to obtain 
identification of these parameters.13  However, in robustness checks for both equations 
(2) and (3), I employ month dummies that incorporate both year and month (e.g.,  
February 2002, March 2002, …, July 2003 for SCO v. IBM; August 2005, September 
2005, …, November 2006 for FireStar/DataTern v. Red Hat); these models will allow me 
to better control for unobserved time-varying factors in both models. However, in these 
models I am unable to identify the parameter β0 as it is perfectly collinear with these 
month dummies.  Fourth, I use the log transformation of downloads as the dependent 
                                                 
 
 
13 Specifically, my sample is from July 2005 to November 2006. Year dummies and month-of-year 
dummies are collinear with lawsuit. 
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variable because the distribution of downloads is highly skewed. Last, I do not include 
the direct effects of the variables Linux_kerneli, business_app_on_Linuxi,  
object_relationali,  and JBoss_relatedi as they will be absorbed in the fixed effects (i.e., 
since they do not vary over time they are perfectly collinear with the fixed effects). As in 
all difference-in-difference regressions, the identifying assumption for my model is that 
the average change in unobserved factors in my sample is similar for the treatment and 
control group (Angrist and Pischke 2009). To explore the likely accuracy of this 
assumption, I explore the robustness of my results to different controls, different control 
groups, and to a falsification exercise. 
 My interest is in testing whether β1 < 0 (H1) and β2 < 0 (H2) for both specification 
(2.2) and (2.3). The baseline coefficients for specifications (2.2) and (2.3) are shown in 
columns 1 through 3 in tables 2.3 and 2.4. To test the robustness of my results, I add the 
above set of controls incrementally. The estimated β1 is significantly negative in both 
tables 2.3 and 2.4, together confirming H1. More specifically, in the months following 
the filing of SCO v. IBM, Linux kernel projects had a 15%-16% greater decline in 
downloads than projects in the control group; in the same manner, in the months 
following the filing of FireStar/DataTern v. Red Hat, projects about the mapping method 
between an object model and a relational database were faced with an 13% greater 
decline relative to projects in the control group. Second, the estimated β2 is also 
significantly negative in both tables 2.3 and 2.4, together confirming H2. In the months 
following the filing of SCO v. IBM, OSS projects that were intended primarily for 
business organizations and that run exclusively on Linux were associated with a 34%-
35% greater decline than projects in the control group. Further, in the months following 
the filing of FireStar/DataTern v. Red Hat, OSS projects specific to JBoss were faced 
with a 16%-17% greater decline than the control group. 
 To mitigate concerns about time-varying omitted variables bias, I conduct a series 
of robustness tests. First, as noted above, I use another (larger) set of month dummies to 
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control for any time-varying factors that may influence downloads (i.e., I use 18 month 
dummies for SCO v. IBM and 16 month dummies for FireStar/DataTern v. Red Hat). As 
noted above, the drawback of this strategy is that the direct effect of lawsuitt is absorbed 
into these dummies and thus β0 is dropped. As shown in columns 4 to 6 in tables 2.3 and 
2.4, the estimated coefficients (and implied marginal effects) from these models are 
similar to those in the main specification. 
 In my second robustness check I implement a falsification test to provide further 
evidence that my results do not reflect the presence of time-varying unobserved factors 
that may be correlated with lawsuit and the treated groups.14 For example, one potential 
concern is that there may exist unobserved events that disproportionately affect my 
treatment group. For example, on April 10, 2006 Red Hat acquired JBoss (two months 
from the June 26, 2006 date of the FireStar/DataTern v. Red Hat case); this acquisition 
might have influenced user perceptions of the value of adopting projects running on 
JBoss. Falsification tests of this nature are commonly employed in difference-in-
difference estimation (Bertrand et al. 2004). I create a dummy false_lawsuit that is set 
equal to 1 if the observation is from the period three months before the actual filing date 
of lawsuit and set it to be 0 otherwise. The logic for this falsification test is that if my 
estimates reflect causal relationships, then the incidence of the lawsuit should have no 
effect on downloads prior to when the lawsuit was actually filed. That is, the interactions 
of false_lawsuit with Linux_kernel and business_app_on_Linux should not be 
significantly negative. 
     The results are presented from column 7 to 9 in tables 2.3 and 2.4. The estimated 
β1 and β2 again confirm my hypotheses. Further, the coefficients on the false_lawsuit 
                                                 
 
 
14 To further address any concern about the serial correlation of downloads within project over time, I 
follow Bertrand et al. (2004) and implement another robustness test: I average the data before and after the 
lawsuit and run the main specifications on these averaged time-varying variables in a panel of length 2. 
This approach has yielded qualitatively similar results. 
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interactions are either insignificant or positive, which is consistent with my assertion that 
my results reflect a causal relationship between an IPR enforcement action and 






                                                 
 
 
15 To further study the implications of the JBoss acquisition, I also experimented with using a false_lawsuit 
that is set equal to 1 if the observation is from the period two months before the actual filing date of 
lawsuit. The results are qualitatively similar. 
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Table 2.3 User Interest, SCO v. IBM 
Dependent var: 
log (downloads) 
Main Specification Monthly Time Dummies Falsification Test 













































































































































Number of groups 3928 3928 3928 3928 3928 3928 3928 3928 3928 
Number of obs 74632 74632 74632 74632 74632 74632 74632 74632 74632 
R square .871 .873 .873 .878 .879 .879 .871 .873 .873 
Notes: 1) +: significant at 10%; *: significant at 5%; **: significant at 1%; ***: significant at 0.1%; 2) heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered over 
projects are in parentheses; 3) sample is composed of projects that have positive downloads for each month during the sampling period; 4) R-squared includes 
fixed effects in R-squared computation  
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Table 2.4 User Interest, FireStar/DataTern v. Red Hat 
Dependent var: 
log (downloads) 
Main Specification Monthly Time Dummies Falsification Test 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
lawsuit 
.534   
(.013)*** 
.530   
(.013)*** 
.556   
(.014)*** 
















































      
.023     
(.090) 
-.033     
(.091) 




      
-.060     
(.063) 
-.066     
(.062) 
-.066     
(.062) 







Project Project Project 





































Number of groups 24301 24301 24301 24301 24301 24301 24301 24301 24301 
Number of obs 413117 413117 413117 413117 413117 413117 413117 413117 413117 
R square .903 .903 .903 .910 .910 .910 .903 .903 .903 
Notes: 1) +: significant at 10%; *: significant at 5%; **: significant at 1%; ***: significant at 0.1%; 2) heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered over 
projects are in parentheses; 3) sample is composed of projects that have positive downloads for each month during the sampling period; 4) R-squared includes 
fixed effects in R-squared computation. 
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2.5.2 Robustness Checks For User Interest Regressions 
 In this section I describe the results of additional robustness checks of my 
analyses on how IPR enforcement affects user interest. One possibility is that because 
OSS projects with a large installed base may provide a more inviting target to IPR rights 
holders and subsequently exhibit greater litigation risks, it is possible that my empirical 
results are driven by the change in adoption from only OSS projects with the largest 
installed base. To examine this possibility, I construct an alternative sample that excludes 
OSS projects with preexisting installed base in the top 5% from the baseline sample. As 


















Table 2.5 User Interest (Alternative Sample), SCO v. IBM 
Dependent var: 
log (downloads) 
Main Specification Monthly Time Dummies Falsification Test 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
lawsuit  -.441 (.038)*** -.443 (.038)*** -.472 (.042)***    -.439 (.038)*** -.441 (.038)*** -.471 (.042)*** 
lawsuit · Linux_kernel 
-.173       
(.084)* 
-.179      
(.083)* 








-.140        
(.091)+ 





-.432     
(.149)*** 
-.419     
(.152)** 








-.475       
(.160)*** 
-.459    
(.163)** 




      
.152          
(.074)* 
.159        
(.072)* 




      
-.198           
(.123) 
-.188        
(.124) 




of Year, Year 
Project, Month 
of Year, Year 
Project, Month 








of Year, Year 
Project, Month 
of Year, Year 
Project, Month 
of Year, Year 




























installed base installed base 
installed base, 
license 
Number of groups 3730 3730 3730 3730 3730 3730 3730 3730 3730 
Number of obs 70870 70870 70870 70870 70870 70870 70870 70870 70870 
R square .843 .845 .845 .852 .853 .853 .843 .845 .845 
Notes: 1) +: significant at 10%; *: significant at 5%; **: significant at 1%; ***: significant at 0.1%; 2) heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered over 
projects are in parentheses; 3) the alternative sample is the baseline sample excluding projects having top 5% preexisting installed base; 4) R-squared includes 
fixed effects in R-squared computation 
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Table 2.6 User Interest (Alternative Sample), FireStar/DataTern v. Red Hat 
Dependent var: 
log (downloads) 
Main Specification Monthly Time Dummies Falsification Test 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
lawsuit 
.636   
(.014)*** 
.631   
(.014)*** 
.645   
(.014)*** 
   
.636   
(.014)*** 
.631   
(.014)*** 
.645   
(.014)*** 































































Project Project Project 











new files , 
developers 
























Number of groups 23089 23089 23089 23089 23089 23089 23089 23089 23089 
Number of obs 392513 392513 392513 392513 392513 392513 392513 392513 392513 
R square .868 .868 .868 .878 .878 .879 .868 .868 .868 
Notes: 1) +: significant at 10%; *: significant at 5%; **: significant at 1%; ***: significant at 0.1%; 2) heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered over 
projects are in parentheses; 3) the alternative sample is the baseline sample excluding projects with top 5% preexisting installed base; 4) R-squared includes fixed 
effects in R-squared computation. 
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 As noted above, a key requirement in my difference-in-difference approach is that 
unmeasured factors affect the treatment group and control group equally in my 
regressions. To further probe the validity of this assumption, I conduct a set of subsample 
analyses in which I provide a more precisely matched control group for the treatment 
groups used to test H2. Unfortunately, due to the nature of the treatment group for H1, it 
is very difficult to similarly find a more precisely matched control group for these 
projects. Thus, in these analyses I am only able to examine the robustness of my results 
for H2.  
 I compile a new set of narrower control groups in my tests of H2 for both cases. 
For SCO v. IBM, I identify the new control group as the set of projects that are intended 
for business users and can run on operating systems other than Linux. For 
FireStar/DataTern v. Red Hat, I construct the new control group as the set of projects 
that are related to Java Platform, Enterprise Edition, but not related to JBoss. I believe 
that these control groups are closely matched to the treatment groups, so without any 
lawsuit, the treatment group should exhibit the same time trend in downloads as this 












Table 2.7 User Interest, Sub-Sample  
SCO v. IBM 
Dependent var: 
log (downloads) 
Main Specification Monthly Time Dummies 




































































Number of groups 93 93 93 93 93 93 
Number of obs 1767 1767 1767 1767 1767 1767 
R square .852 .852 .852 .862 .863 .863 
FireStar/DataTern v. Red Hat 
Dependent var: 
log (downloads) 
Main Specification Monthly Time Dummies 




.345    
(.149)* 
.349    
(.149)* 
   



















Time-varying controls new files 
new files, 
developers 





















Number of groups 168 168 168 168 168 168 
Number of obs 2856 2856 2856 2856 2856 2856 
R square .919 .920 .920 .925 .926 .926 
Notes: 1) +: significant at 10%; *: significant at 5%; **: significant at 1%; ***: significant at 0.1%; 2) 
heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered over projects are in parentheses; 3) R-squared includes 





 One potential question in the construction of H2 is whether downloads for all 
types of platform-specific OSS projects decline in the face of an IPR enforcement action 
against a platform (instead of just those business-intended projects). This question is 
particularly an issue for the SCO v. IBM case, since there are a large number of projects 
that use the Linux platform but that are not intended for business use. To investigate this 
question, I compiled for the SCO v. IBM case a new treatment group composed of all 
applications running exclusively on Linux. However, I did not find a significant 
difference between the changes in downloads for this group of projects and other 
projects. This further confirms my hypothesis that IPR enforcement particularly affects 
user interest toward those business-intended OSS projects specific to a litigated OSS 
platform. 
2.5.3 Baseline Analyses For Developer Activity 
 The dependent variable to test hypotheses 3 and 4 is the number of closed 
artifacts. The summary statistics in table 1 show that the mean number of closed artifacts 
is either 5.4 (for SCO v. IBM) or 3.6 (for FireStar/DataTern v. Red Hat); in these types of 
settings, count data models are appropriate (Chapter 20, Cameron and Trivedi 2005).16  
Therefore, I employ count data models and use conditional fixed effects to control for 
differences in developer activity across OSS projects. Given the amount of time to 
complete a programming task, I expect a delay between the time when work on an 
artifact is begun and when completed tasks are reported. Accordingly, if an IPR 
enforcement action affects developer incentives, I may expect some delay between when 
the enforcement action is initiated and when this change in behavior is reflected in the 
                                                 
 
 
16 However, as a robustness check, I also implemented a linear model. The results are consistent with my 
baseline count data model. 
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number of closed artifacts. Therefore, in my empirical models, I lag all independent 
variables by one month.17  More specifically, suppose the number of closed artifacts for 
OSS project i in month t (denoted as Closed_Artifactsit) follows a Poisson process with 
parameter λit taking the form  λit = exp(Xit-1’β). Also suppose αi is a project-specific and 
time-invariant variable that incorporates unobserved heterogeneity of the project i. So 
E(Closed_Artifactsit|Xit-1,αi)=λit=αiexp(Xit-1’β), where 
SCO v. IBM: Xit-1’β = β0 lawsuitt-1 + β1 lawsuitt-1*Linux_kerneli +  
β2 lawsuitt-1*business_app_on_Linuxi + γ1 installed_baseit-1 





FireStar/DataTern v. Red Hat: Xit-1’β = β0 lawsuitt-1 +  
β1 lawsuitt-1*object_relationali + β2 lawsuitt-1* JBoss_relatedi 





 I estimate these models using maximum likelihood with robust standard errors 
clustered at the project level. Similar to the specifications related to user interest, for SCO 
v. IBM, I include a year dummy (i.e. year2003) and 11 month-of-year dummies (i.e., 
February, …, December) to control for time and seasonality trends in developer activity. 
For FireStar/DataTern v. Red Hat, I am not able to identify these time effects because of 
insufficient variance in my data. Second, as before, I set installed_baseit and 
restrictive_licenseit to zero before the IPR enforcement lawsuits to prevent them from 
being differenced out of the regression; I add controls incrementally to explore the 
robustness of my results. Third, I also implement robustness checks for both equations 
(4) and (5) by employing another (larger) set of month dummies to control for any time-
varying factors that may influence closed artifacts (i.e., I use 17 month dummies for SCO 
                                                 
 
 
17 I also tried to lag independent variables by two months. The results are very consistent with results based 
on one-month lag. 
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v. IBM and 15 month dummies for FireStar/DataTern v. Red Hat). Last, the direct effects 
of the variables Linux_kerneli, business_app_on_Linuxi, object_relationali, and 
JBoss_relatedi are absorbed in the parameter αi and not included in the specifications. 
 My interest is testing whether β1 < 0 (H3) and β2 < 0 (H4) for specification (2.4) 
and (2.5). The estimated coefficients are shown in columns 1 to 3 in tables 2.8 and 2.9. 
First, the estimated β1 is significantly negative for both cases, together confirming H1: 
the parameter estimates imply that Linux kernel projects experienced 45%-47% fewer 
closed artifacts than the control group in the months following the filing of SCO v. IBM; 
similarly, in the months following the filing of FireStar/DataTern v. Red Hat, projects 
about the mapping method between an object model and a relational database had 89%-
90% fewer closed artifacts than the control group. Second, the estimated β2 is also 
significantly negative for both cases, together confirming H4. The parameter estimates 
imply that in the months following the filing of SCO v. IBM, OSS projects that were 
intended primarily for business organizations and that run exclusively on Linux had 86%-
87% fewer closed artifacts than the control group; meanwhile, in the months following 
the filing of FireStar/DataTern v. Red Hat, OSS projects specific to the JBoss suite also 
experienced about 84% fewer closed artifact than the control group. Moreover, as shown 
in column 4 to column 6 in tables 2.8 and 2.9, the results based on the specifications with 
a larger set of month dummies are consistent with the baseline results. 
 As I had done in my analyses on user interest, I conduct a falsification test to 
provide further evidence that the results do not reflect the presence of time-varying 
unobserved factors that may be correlated with lawsuit and the treated groups. The results 
are presented in columns 7 to 9 in tables 2.8 and 2.9. The estimated β1 and β2 again 
confirm my hypotheses. Further, all of the coefficients for the interactions with 
false_lawsuit are statistically insignificant, offering additional evidence that my results 
reflect the effect of IPR enforcement on developer activity instead of some omitted time-
varying factors.  
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Table 2.8 Developer Activity, SCO v. IBM 
closed artifacts 
Main Specification Monthly Time Dummies Falsification Test 




.187   
(.334) 
.194   
(.396) 
   
.243 
(.363) 
.186   
(.335) 
.193   
(.396) 
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Number of groups 904 904 904 904 904 904 904 904 904 
Number of obs 16272 16272 16272 16272 16272 16272 16272 16272 16272 
Log pseudolikelihood -57559.54 -56910.27 -56910.08 -57525.69 -56873.20 -56873.01 -57556.71 -56908.88 -56908.68 
Notes: 1) +: significant at 10%; *: significant at 5%; **: significant at 1%; ***: significant at 0.1%; 2) robust standard errors clustered over projects are in 
parentheses; 3) sample is composed of projects that have total number of closed artifacts above the 25th percentile of closed artifacts (i.e. above 3). 4) The above 
16,272 observations are from 904 projects over 18 months (one month is dropped because I use the lagged closed artifacts). 
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Table 2.9 Developer Activity, FireStar/DataTern v. Red Hat 
closed artifacts 
Main Specification Monthly Time Dummies Falsification Test 
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Number of groups 2311 2311 2311 2311 2311 2311 2311 2311 2311 
Number of obs 36976 36976 36976 36976 36976 36976 36976 36976 36976 
Log 
pseudolikelihood 
-108080.07 -108026.76 -107989.63 -107684.41 -107625.12 -107588.30 -108062.88 -108008.53 -107971.42 
Notes: 1) +: significant at 10%; *: significant at 5%; **: significant at 1%; ***: significant at 0.1%; 2) robust standard errors clustered over projects are in 
parentheses; 3) sample is composed of projects that have total number of closed artifacts above the 25th percentile of closed artifacts (i.e. above 2); 4) The above 
36,976 observations are from 2,311 projects over 16 months (one month is dropped because I use the lagged closed artifacts).  
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 Last, to further boost confidence in my results, I implement all the above tests for 
H3 and H4 using an alternative sample that consists of all projects that have total number 
of artifacts larger than zero (recall that my baseline sample includes only projects with 
total number of closed artifacts above the 25th percentile in the sample). As shown in 
tables 2.10 and 2.11, the results are qualitatively similar to the baseline ones. Similarly, 
as I had done in my robustness test of H2, I also construct a set of closely matched 
control groups—business projects running on other platforms for SCO v. IBM and 
projects that are related to J2EE Platform but not JBoss for FireStar/DataTern v. Red 
Hat. As shown in table 2.12, my results from the subsample analyses are consistent with 


















Table 2.10 Developer Activity (Alternative Sample), SCO v. IBM 
closed artifacts 
Main Specification Monthly Time Dummies Falsification Test 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
lawsuit  
.232    
(.360) 
.176   
(.331) 
.186   
(.393) 
   
.230    
(.360) 
.175    
(.332) 
.185    
(.394) 


















































































msg posted msg posted 
 
msg posted msg posted 
 























Number of groups 1277 1277 1277 1277 1277 1277 1277 1277 1277 
Number of obs 22986 22986 22986 22986 22986 22986 22986 22986 22986 
Log pseudolikelihood -59360.73 -58710.34 -58709.96 -59327.46 -58673.87 -58673.51 -59357.28 -58708.48 -58708.11 
Notes: 1) +: significant at 10%; *: significant at 5%; **: significant at 1%; ***: significant at 0.1%; 2) robust standard errors clustered over projects are in 
parentheses; 3) the alternative sample is composed of projects that have total number of closed artifacts larger than zero; 4) The above 22,986 observations are 





Table 2.11 Developer Activity (Alternative Sample), FireStar/DataTern v. Red Hat 
closed artifacts 
Main Specification Monthly Time Dummies Falsification Test 












































































Project Project Project 
Time-varying controls 
 
msg posted msg posted 
 
msg posted msg posted 
 























Number of groups 3239 3239 3239 3239 3239 3239 3239 3239 3239 
Number of obs 51824 51824 51824 51824 51824 51824 51824 51824 51824 
Log pseudolikelihood -111485.41 -111432.58 -111397.70 -111071.94 -111012.82 -110978.25 -111469.03 -111415.18 -111380.33 
Notes: 1) +: significant at 10%; *: significant at 5%; **: significant at 1%; ***: significant at 0.1%; 2) robust standard errors clustered over projects are in 
parentheses; 3) the alternative sample is composed of projects that have total number of closed artifacts larger than zero; 4) the above 51,824 observations are 






Table 2.12 Developer Activity, Sub-Sample  
SCO v. IBM 
closed artifacts 
Main Specification Monthly Time Dummies 
















































installed base installed base 
installed 
base, license 
Number of groups 25 25 25 25 25 25 
Number of obs 450 450 450 450 450 450 
Log pseudolikelihood -1479.428 -1477.027 -1429.667 -1448.332 -1447.304 -1400.948 
FireStar/DataTern v. Red Hat 
closed artifacts 
Main Specification Monthly Time Dummies 








   





























installed base installed base 
installed 
base, license 
Number of groups 27 27 27 27 27 27 
Number of obs 432 432 432 432 432 432 
Log pseudolikelihood -1202.439 -1194.043 -1185.241 -1130.489 -1105.896 -1098.621 
Notes: 1) +: significant at 10%; *: significant at 5%; **: significant at 1%; 2) robust standard errors 
clustered over projects are in parentheses.  
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2.6 Conclusions 
 Motivated by a stream of literature on how the introduction of IPR affects the use 
and production of knowledge in the public domain, I take a first step towards 
investigating the implications of formal IPR for OSS use and development. Specifically, I 
examine how the enforcement of IPR influence two key metrics of OSS success—the 
success of an OSS project in attracting user adoption (which I label as user interest) and 
the success of an OSS project in attracting developers to contribute (which I label as 
developer activity). I hypothesize that IPR enforcement can affect user interest and 
developer activity among two key groups: those that display technology overlap with the 
litigated project and those business OSS projects specific to the litigated platform. To test 
these hypotheses, I examine the impact of two widely known and reported IPR 
enforcement actions—SCO v. IBM and FireStar/DataTern v. Red Hat—on downloads 
and closed artifacts of OSS projects extracted from SRDA. My empirical evidence 
strongly supports my hypotheses. The empirical results are also robust to a series of 
robustness checks.  
 This study provides several insights. First, my results advance recent research on 
the effects of formal IPR protection on the production and use of public knowledge 
goods. While these issues have been studied empirically in other settings such as 
scientific research (e.g., Murray and Stern 2007), they have not to my knowledge been 
studied in the context of OSS. This is surprising, given that the large number of recent 
IPR enforcement actions against OSS projects (e.g., surrounding mobile phone 
technology and the Android platform) suggests great salience of these issues to the OSS 
community.  
 My research also advances the literature on OSS project success. I build upon 
recent work that has explored how factors outside of an OSS project’s characteristics 
influence user and developer behavior (e.g., Chengalur-Smith et al. 2010). In particular, I 
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highlight the presence and enforcement of formal IPR, and how these influence the 
benefits to participating in the OSS community.  
 My research shows that IPR enforcement has a significant impact on user 
behavior: downloads of certain types of projects that were related to litigated ones 
experienced a significant decline after the announcement of an IPR enforcement action. 
Several firms who commercialize OSS projects, such as Red Hat and Novell, have 
offered warranty or indemnification programs to mitigate potential costs of legal 
infringement for their customers. My results suggest the potential value of such programs 
to users.  
 My research also shows that IPR enforcement actions are associated with a 
significant decline in developer activity. This finding complements recent work that has 
studied the implications of formal IPR in the proprietary software industry (e.g., Graham 
and Mowery 2003, Cockburn and MacGarvie 2011). In particular, while prior work has 
shown that the presence of formal IPR like patents can lead to a decline in new product 
entry from proprietary software firms (Cockburn and MacGarvie 2011), there has been 
no similar work in OSS. My research advances the literature by demonstrating the 
implications of formal IPR for new products developed as OSS.   
 Last, I add to recent efforts among Information Systems researchers to evaluate 
the impact of changes to legal regimes on economic outcomes in settings such as online 
file sharing  (Bhattacharjee et al. 2006), the supply of creative work (Png and Wang 
2009), and identity theft (Romanosky et al. 2008). In particular, I add to recent efforts 
studying how IPR enforcement actions influence technology adoption (Tucker 2012): I 
highlight the role of the IPR environment and show how IPR enforcement actions will 
influence the prevailing model of OSS adoption and diffusion.  
 While my research provides an important first step towards understanding how 
IPR enforcement actions influence OSS project success, there are limitations. For one, 
my difference-in-difference approach relies upon revealed preferences to infer how the 
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costs and benefits of using and developing OSS change after an IPR enforcement action. 
While this approach has the advantage that it does not require OSS participants to recall 
their costs and benefits of adoption and use, it would be valuable to corroborate my 
findings using measured costs and benefits, potentially from survey data. Second, my 
approach relies on the study of two specific events over two specific time periods. I leave 
it to future work to study whether my results generalize to other time periods. Third, my 
empirical investigation on H1 and H3 focused on lawsuits targeting against OSS 
platforms, so it would be valuable to test whether these hypotheses hold in other settings. 
 While my research takes a first step at examining the implications of formal IPR 
enforcement on OSS project success, there are ample opportunities for future research. 
First, IPR enforcement might induce longer run changes to behavior by developers and 
users. Second, future work might explore what institutional mechanisms might mitigate 
the effects of IPR enforcement on the OSS community. The third chapter of this 
dissertation studies whether OSS patent pools promote new OSS product entry, 
representing a first step in this direction. My findings are provocative, and I hope that my 
research motivates further empirical work into many interesting research questions in this 











PATENT POOLS, THICKETS, AND OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE 
ENTRY BY START-UP FIRMS 
3.1 Introduction 
 There has been significant growth in the development and commercialization of 
open source software (OSS) in recent years. A recent survey has indicated that worldwide 
revenue from commercializing OSS reached $1.8 billion in 2006 and is expected to reach 
$5.8 billion in 2011 (Broersma 2007). However, one barrier to increasing growth in OSS 
innovation is the risk to OSS producers of infringing existing intellectual property rights 
(IPR) such as patents.  
 While patent thickets have been shown to deter firm entry into the software 
industry (Cockburn and MacGarvie 2011), the nature of OSS innovation suggests that 
innovation in this type of software may be particularly sensitive to IPR enforcement 
actions for several reasons. First, the distributed, incremental development approach to 
developing OSS implies that innovation is highly cumulative. Moreover, this same 
approach makes it difficult to identify the provenance of source code, imposing high 
costs on OSS developers who wish to identify potentially infringing technologies. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that IPR enforcement against OSS can have a significant 
impact on software markets, as demonstrated by the well-known set of lawsuits by the 
SCO Group against Linux as well as the most recent set of lawsuits among Apple, 
Samsung, and HTC that are related to the Android open source platform. 
 One way to ameliorate the patent thickets problem for OSS innovation is the 
creation of royalty-free patent pools, a special type of patent pool that offers royalty-free 
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usage of patents to any firm that promises not to sue the pool’s beneficiaries (Lévêque 
and Ménière 2007, Serafino 2007, Hall and Helmers 2011).18  However, the empirical 
effectiveness of such patent pools in mitigating the patent thicket problem is largely 
unknown. Prior studies of patent pools have focused largely on traditional patent pools 
that delineate specific licensing rules and restrictions to non-pool members. These 
traditional patent pools have been shown to have an uncertain impact on the rate of 
innovation (e.g., Lerner and Tirole 2004, Lampe and Moser 2009, Joshi and Nerkar 
2011).  
 There is also reason to question the impact of royalty-free patent pools on 
innovation and competition. Inventors may have insufficient incentives to provide 
intellectual property as a public good to the community (Gambardella and Hall 2006), 
and so royalty-free patent pools may contain few or low-quality patents that have little 
impact on innovative activity. One software industry commentator, for instance, suggests 
that “the perception is that bigger companies only commit their least-effective, least-
important patents to a patent pool” (Seeker 2010). In their recent analysis of patents 
pledged to the “Eco-Patent Commons,” established in 2008 to provide royalty-free access 
to third parties to patented technologies related to climate change, Hall and Helmers 
(2011) find mixed evidence on their impact on innovation in a different industry setting. 
While their analysis is preliminary—due to the short period of time following the 
establishment of this particular patent pool—the authors conclude that patents contributed 
to the Eco-Patent Commons have “no discernible impact on the diffusion of the 
knowledge embedded in the protected technologies to other patenting firms” (Hall and 
Helmers 2011). 
                                                 
 
 
18 Hall and Helmers (2011) refer to a royalty-free patent pool as a patent commons. I have found both labels 
are currently in use, and use the label royalty-free patent pool both to draw a distinction to traditional patent 
pools and to avoid confusion with the OSS “Patent Commons” that was developed by IBM and is a focus 
of this study. 
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 Motivated by these observations, I take a first step to evaluate how innovation is 
influenced by the creation of a royalty-free patent pool that is made available to the OSS 
community. Specifically, I examine the impact of such an OSS patent pool on entry by 
start-ups using an OSS license (which I refer to as “OSS entry”).19  My focus on this 
margin of innovation is motivated by several considerations. First, the formation of OSS 
patent pools may have a particularly strong impact on start-up innovation. Unlike large 
firms, start-ups usually lack the R&D capabilities and financial resources required to 
expand their own patent portfolios, so it is difficult for them to navigate patent thickets 
using other approaches such as cross-licensing agreements.20  This is particularly likely to 
be the case for start-ups that produce OSS and who, for a variety of reasons, may be 
unlikely to patent their innovations. Further, as has been highlighted elsewhere, my 
knowledge of the implications of formal IP rights for OSS innovation is still quite limited 
(Lerner and Tirole 2005a, von Hippel and von Krogh 2003). My focus on entry is 
motivated by my context: since many firms producing under an OSS license do not 
patent, traditional patent-based measures of innovation are inappropriate for my setting. 
In short, due to the uncertainty about the effectiveness of OSS patent pools, my research 
strategy is to examine their impact along a margin of innovation where they are more 
likely to matter. I leave the implications for other types of innovation (such as entry under 
proprietary licenses and the behavior of large firms) for future work.  
 To motivate my empirical analysis, I develop a model that shows how an OSS 
patent pool can change the bargaining game between a proprietary incumbent patent 
holder and a start-up firm. The model, which builds on prior work by Llobet (2003) and 
                                                 
 
 
19 I similarly refer to firms that have engaged in OSS as “OSS firms.” More precisely, an OSS firm is 
defined as one that develops, uses, or commercializes source code that meets the Open Source Initiative 
definition of open source software. 
20 As noted by Matt Asay, the chief operating officer at Canonical (the company behind the Ubuntu Linux 
operating system), “this [type of patent collective] may be the only refuge for start-ups and others, like Red 
Hat, that don’t have an aggressive patent-acquisition policy.” (Matt Asay 2010). 
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Galasso and Schankerman (2010), shows that increases in the size of the pool influence 
the outcome of the litigation game and consequently the start-up’s OSS entry decision. 
Comparative statics from the model show that (i) changes in the size of the OSS patent 
pool related to a software segment facilitates OSS entry by start-up firms into the same 
segment; and (ii) the marginal effect of the pool on OSS entry will be especially large in 
software segments where the cumulativeness of innovation is high or where patent 
ownership in a segment is concentrated. 
 Focusing on one major OSS patent pool—the Patent Commons—I examine the 
empirical salience of these predictions using a unique data set. I assemble data on OSS 
entry using data on product releases from 2,054 start-up software firms contained in the 
Gale database “PROMT”. Following prior work that has examined the extent to which 
patents deter entry into the software industry (Cockburn and MacGarvie 2009, 2011), I 
allocate patents to software product market segments by (i) identifying the main 
technological classes of patents acquired and cited by single software product producers 
and (ii) comparing a set of keywords from a software segment classification with the 
keywords from the patent’s technological classes. I use this mapping to identify the 
number of pool patents related to each market segment, as well as the cumulativeness of 
innovation and patent ownership concentration in the segment.  
 Using count data conditional fixed effects models, my empirical strategy 
examines whether time series variation in the number of patent claims in the OSS patent 
pool related to a software segment is associated with changes in the number of OSS 
entrants into that segment. My initial approach is to assume that changes in the number of 
pool claims are uncorrelated with omitted variables that may influence OSS entry by 
start-ups. I later relax this assumption, employing count data models with instrumental 
variables using Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation. My first instrument 
uses the pre-sampling stock of patents held by the major patent pool contributor—IBM—
across each of the market segments in my sample. I interact this variable with time 
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dummies to obtain time series variation. My second instrument uses the number of IBM 
patents that were opposed at the European Patent Office in each software segment-year. 
 My results suggest that a 10% increase in the pool’s patent claims in a software 
segment is associated with a 1.5%-2.9% increase in the rate of OSS entry by start-ups 
into that segment.21  The marginal impact of the OSS patent pool is significantly greater 
in segments where the cumulativeness of innovation is high: a 10% increase in the pool’s 
patent claims is associated with a 3.8%-5.6% increase in the rate of OSS entry when the 
cumulativeness of innovation is at its 90th percentile, compared to no significant increase 
when cumulativeness is at its 10th percentile. The effect of OSS patents pools is also 
greater when the concentration of patent ownership is high. A 10% increase in the pool’s 
patent claims is associated with a 1.3%-1.7% increase when patent concentration is at its 
90th percentile and no increase when patent concentration is at its 10th percentile, 
however the statistical significance of these results vary somewhat across specifications. I 
explore the robustness of all of my results to adding a variety of controls, as well as to 
GMM instrumental variables estimation. These additional analyses suggest a causal 
interpretation to my results.  
 My study provides the first large sample evidence on how the provision of a 
royalty-free patent pool shapes OSS entry by start-ups. As such, my research adds to the 
literature that looks at how IPR licensing and enforcement influences OSS innovation 
(Graham and Mowery 2005, Lerner and Tirole 2005b, Maurer and Scotchmer 2006) as 
well as recent work that studies firm decisions to commercialize innovations using an 
OSS license (Bonaccorsi et al. 2006; Dahlander 2007, Fosfuri et al. 2008). 
 My research also adds to recent studies that empirically investigate the economic 
implications of patent pools. While previous studies on patent pools have focused mainly 
                                                 
 
 
21 All marginal effects are evaluated at mean values of covariates. 
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on their design (e.g., Lerner and Tirole 2004, Lerner et al. 2007, Layne-Farrar and Lerner 
2010), a few recent empirical studies (Lampe and Moser 2010, Joshi and Nerkar 2011, 
Hall and Helmers 2011) have begun to look at the impact of patent pools on the direction 
of innovative activities. However, to the best of my knowledge, there has been no 
empirical research on how patent pools shape start-up entry.  
 Finally, I also contribute to the literature by examining the potential anti-
commons problems from strategic patenting and the impact of patent thickets on entry 
into the software industry (e.g., Cockburn and MacGarvie 2011, Ziedonis 2004). While 
the patent thickets problem can be examined from different perspectives, I highlight the 
roles of cumulativeness of innovation and patent ownership concentration as two 
different and important dimensions of patent thickets. I propose mechanisms under which 
these characteristics may interact with the OSS patent pool to determine start-up entry 
costs. Thus, my research also provides empirical evidence on the effectiveness of 
mechanisms meant to mitigate the anti-commons problem, such as the establishment of 
patent pools or standard-setting organizations (Shapiro 2001, Rysman and Simcoe 2008). 
3.2 Theory And Hypotheses 
 I study the implications of a royalty-free patent pool for entry into an OSS market 
segment. While I describe the institutional characteristics of these patent pools below, 
their key features are that licensees are neither required to pay a license fee nor are they 
required to contribute patents to the pool. Patent pool licensees can use the patent pool 
defensively when facing litigation from non-pool patent holders. In this section I develop 
a simple model that delineates how the size of an OSS patent pool, together with the 
nature of innovative activity and the distribution of patent holdings in the segment, 
shapes start-up decisions to enter into that segment by releasing a new product under an 
open source license. This model builds upon and extends recent work by Llobet (2003) 
and Galasso and Schankerman (2010).  
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 Consider a start-up’s decision to enter into a software segment by introducing a 
new OSS product that could generate a revenue V.22  Suppose this market segment has a 
set of patented technologies held by n different parties that the start-up has to navigate 
through to successfully enter into the segment. I assume these parties are symmetrical in 
importance. I examine the case in which the start-up already has access to n-1 of the 
required patents that would enable it to generate a value V’<V, and study how the 
existence of the patent pool affects the nth negotiation. The start-up’s OSS product uses 
some code developed by the open source community substituting the nth party’s patented 
technology to make an improvement ∆ on the code.23  In other words, product 
improvements are ordered as a quality ladder, as in O’Donoghue et al. (1998) and 
Scotchmer (2005). If it enters, the start-up also faces an irreversible investment c 
associated with developing and commercializing the new product. Upon the start-up’s 
introduction of this new OSS product, the nth party can make a settlement offer to the 
start-up.  
 My analysis proceeds in two stages. First, I show how the size of the OSS patent 
pool related to a segment influences the litigation game outcome and consequently the 
start-up’s entry decision. Second, I examine how the marginal effect of the pool is 
influenced by the value at stake in the nth negotiation, which is in turn determined by the 
features of the patent thickets in the market segment. In particular, I focus on two features 
of patent thickets stressed by prior literature (Noel and Schankerman 2006, Cockburn and 
MacGarvie 2011). The first is the cumulativeness of innovation within a software 
segment, defined as the extent to which the innovations within a segment are related with 
                                                 
 
 
22 While a firm may produce both open and closed source software (e.g., Bonaccorsi et al. 2006, Lerner and 
Schankerman 2010), it often does not view these two as substitutes when considering whether to enter a 
market segment. This viewpoint is consistent with empirical evidence from my data. 
23 Alternatively, the code could be developed internally and issued under an OSS license. While the 
following discussion still holds under this case, this would add an additional strategic decision for the start-
up firm: whether to enter under an open source or proprietary license. 
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or build upon each other. Second, I study the concentration of patent ownership within a 
software segment. In my setting, the concentration of patent ownership translates to the 
number of parties holding the set of essential blocking patents with whom the start-up 
must negotiate.  
 Following Galasso and Schankerman (2010) and Lerner and Tirole (2004), I use 
the following equation to capture the value at stake for the nth negotiation. 
, ,  ≡  − ’ =  −   − 1  (3.1) 
The value at stake in the nth negotiation can be written as the difference between V and 
V’. I use ’ =    to indicate the value obtainable using only the n-1 patents that are 
already held by the start-up. Equation (1) shows how characteristics of the patent thicket 
influence the value of the nth negotiation. First, n is the total number of parties that hold 
blocking patents. A decrease of n (an increase of concentration of patent ownership) 
increases the value of the nth round of negotiation v, i.e., ∂ v/∂ n<0. The parameter θ 
captures the extent of cumulativeness in innovation and will influence the value of the nth 
negotiation:  For example, when innovation in a market segment is very cumulative 
(lower θ), the value at stake in the nth negotiation, v, is very high: it is equal to V if θ=0. 
In contrast, when innovation in a market segment is non-cumulative (high θ), the patents 
held by each of the n parties will independently contribute value to the new product. In 
the limit, when θ=1 the value at stake in the nth negotiation will be equal to 

 . 
Therefore, ∂ v/∂ θ <0.  
 The litigation game is motivated by the model introduced by Llobet (2003). The 













In the first stage, the start-up decides whether to enter into a software segment by 
introducing a new OSS product. If the start-up decides not to enter, given its current 
access to n-1 patents, its payoff will be ’ =    24;  the nth party will enjoy the 
amount of v0 from other potential licensees. If the start-up decides to enter, the patent 
holder will make a settlement offer to the start-up with a license payment T. Following 
Llobet (2003), suppose the size of the improvement ∆ is private information and 
unobservable to the patent holder; for simplicity, suppose the patent holder knows that ∆ 
is drawn from a uniform distribution G(∆)= ∆ with the density function g(∆)=1. The 
patent holder chooses T to optimize its expected payoff based on the distribution of ∆. 
Therefore, if the start-up accepts the offer, the payoffs will be: 
∆, ,  =  + ∆ −  −  (3.2) 
∆, ,  =  (3.3) 
for the start-up and patent holder, respectively. 
 If the start-up firm rejects the offer, the patent holder can commit to litigate. 
Regardless of the outcome of the litigation, both parties incur a litigation cost denoted as 
Lp for the patent holder and Ls for the start-up. For simplicity, I assume Lp=Ls=L. During 
the legal proceedings, the courts receive a signal on the true value of the patents and 
decide whether the start-up’s invention is infringing or not based on two factors: (i) how 
                                                 
 
 
24 This value may be realized through a variety of different approaches, such as re-licensing the n-1 parties’ 
















much the invention improves upon the infringed patent (∆) and (ii) the validity of the 
patent holder’s patents b. For simplicity, b is assumed as b ∈ [0,1]: b=1 implies the 
patents are valid while conversely b=0 implies the patents are invalid. The probability 
that the courts will favor the patent holder, q (∆, b), is modeled as the following form for 
simplicity: q(∆, b) = b(1-∆).25   
 I argue that OSS patent pools can be used to strengthen a start-up’s negotiating 
position when bargaining over blocking patents that are not part of the pool. Because the 
patents in the pool can be used as prior art during litigation, pool licensees can leverage 
the pool’s patents to invalidate the infringed patents.26  Such prior art searches have been 
used to invalidate infringed patents in several well-known cases where OSS was alleged 
to be infringing, in particular the cases of Firestar/Datatern v. Red Hat (Dillon 2008, 
Paul 2008a) and Trend Micro v. Barracuda Networks (Paul 2008b). The greater the 
number of patents that have been contributed to the pool, the more likely it is that courts 
will identify prior art from the pool to challenge the nth party’s patents.27 Thus, I expect b 
to decrease in the size of x, ∂b/∂x<0. 
 If the start-up is found liable, the court awards the patent holder payment v from 
the start-up. This v represents the payment under the unjust enrichment doctrine, the 
amount that the start-up would earn from successfully infringing this patent, given that it 
                                                 
 
 
25 That is, when b=1 and ∆=0, the courts will rule that the start-up is liable and be made to compensate the 
patent holder. When the start-up makes a significant improvement on the patented technologies, e.g. ∆=1, 
even if b=1, the courts will rule that the start-up is not liable. On the other hand, when the patent is not 
valid, i.e. b=0, no matter how much improvement the start-up makes (for any value of ∆), the start-up will 
not be liable. 
26 To fulfill this defensive role, the Patent Commons project (the major OSS patent pool within the OSS 
community) established a partnership with the USPTO to ensure that patent examiners have access to all 
available prior art in the pool relating to the patents in question. See http://www.patent-
commons.org/news/index.php?displaynews=17&page=1 for more details. 
27 Increases in the size of the patent pool will also strengthen the start-up’s negotiating position if it enables 
the latter to sue the incumbent firm for infringement of one or more of the pool patents. For example, in the 
Trend Micro v. Barracuda Networks case, Barracuda countersued Trend Micro using a portfolio of 
antivirus patents obtained from IBM (Paul 2008b). As I show below, the pool could also effectively reduce 
the threshold for OSS entry through countersuits. 
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had access to the other n-1 proprietary incumbent patents (Galasso and Schankerman 
2010, Schankerman and Scotchmer 2001). Thus, the payoff for the patent holder if it 
wins the lawsuit should be v-L and for the start-up should be V+∆-c-L-v. If the start-up is 
found not liable, the patent holder will lose the royalty payment v for the patent28 and 
incur a payoff -L; the start-up will receive payoff V+∆-c-L. Therefore, the expected 
benefits to the patent holder and the start-up if the start-up rejects the settlement offer can 
be expressed as follows: 
∆, ,  =  + ∆ − ∆,  −  −  (3.4) 
 ∆, ,  = ∆,  −  (3.5) 
 I denote the strategy of the start-up as , which includes two decisions: whether 
to enter by introducing a new OSS product and whether to settle with the patent holder. 
First, there exists an improvement threshold Δ that makes the start-up indifferent between 
not entering (with a payoff    ) and entering. This Δ can be defined from the 
equation (3.6) below. Second, there is a threshold of ∆s(T) that makes the start-up 
indifferent between settlement and going to court: a start-up with improvement larger 
than ∆s(T) will be more confident that it can win at trial and will therefore choose to go to 
court; for ∆ smaller than ∆s(T) but larger than Δ, the start-up would enter but rather settle. 
From equations (3.2) and (3.4), I can implicitly define ∆s(T) using equation (3.7). 
 + Δ −  −  =     (3.6) 
T = ∆,  +  = 1 − ∆ +   (3.7) 
Therefore, the strategy of the start-up as  can be expressed as follows. 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
28 Note that if the patent holder loses, it may not be able to collect the licensing fee v from any potential 
licensee. This is because this ruling decision will make it attractive for the potential licensee to adopt the 
free open source code with functions similar to the patents held by the nth party but with less cost. 
= (out) if ∆<=Δ  (i.e., do not enter) 
σ
 
= (in, accept the offer) if  Δ<=∆<= ∆s(T)  (i.e., enter and pay amount T for licensing fee ) 
= (in, reject the offer) if  ∆ >= ∆s(T)  (i.e., enter and go to trial ) 
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 As assumed by Llobet (2003), while the patent holder does not know the size of 
the improvement ∆, it holds a belief Δ , above which the start-up will enter. Conditional 
on this belief, the patent holder will decide T that maximizes its expected payoff 
!, , "Δ #  




∆.'   (3.8) 
I follow Llobet (2003) to define a pure strategy sequential equilibrium of the litigation 
game to be a strategy profile (∗, ∗) such that (i) ∗ maximizes the expected profits for 
the patent holder in equation (3.8) given a belief Δ  and (ii) for all ∆, ∗∆ maximizes the 
expected profit for the start-up given ∗. 
Lemma 1: The unique pure strategy sequential equilibrium Δ∗ (the optimal improvement 
threshold for OSS entry) has the following form29: 
Δ∗ = 1 +  +  −  −  (3.9) 
Proposition 1: The size of the patent pool x will decrease the minimum improvement 
threshold for OSS entry Δ∗. That is, 0*∗01 < 0. 
 The above proposition highlights the effect of an OSS patent pool on OSS entry. 
By decreasing the likelihood that the courts will uphold the patent,30  the OSS patent pool 
will reduce the expected license payment offered by the patent holder. This decreases the 
threshold of improvement for OSS entry, meaning that start-ups with smaller 
improvements (∆) will enter.  
                                                 
 
 
29 I provide proofs for this lemma and for all other lemma and propositions in the Appendix B. 
30 If we assume the incumbent’s patents to be valid and consider the countersuing effect of the patent pool 
instead, the start-up will be liable with probability 1-∆. However, if the start-up uses the pool patents to 
countersue, one can interpret the parameter b as a discount factor for the damage payments v imposed by 
the court. That is, the start-up will face the reduced damage payments bv and the expected payment from 
the start-up to the patent holder will be (1- ∆) bv. For example, b could represent the effect of ex post 
negotiation between incumbent and start-up that reduces the size of the damages payments to the 
incumbent. Mathematically, the model is unchanged and the equilibrium threshold for OSS entry under this 
alternative interpretation is the same as my baseline model where I model the effects of the patent pool on 
the infringed patents validity. 
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 I now consider how the efficacy of the patent pool is affected by two features of 
patent thickets––the cumulativeness of innovation and the concentration of patent 
ownership. I argue that the key mechanism through which these characteristics influence 
entry lies in how they shape the incremental value obtained from the focal nth negotiation 
(i.e., the size of v). Therefore, I first introduce the following lemma related to the 
interaction of an OSS patent pool and the value at stake for the nth negotiation: 
Lemma 2: The threshold for OSS entry Δ∗ will be lower when both the size of the patent 
pool x is large and the v is high. That is, 
04*∗
0105 < 0. 
 Lemma 2 suggests that the marginal effect of the OSS patent pool in lowering the 
licensing payment T will be most important when v is high. Intuitively, consider the start-
up’s entry decision, which depends on both the value (i.e., ∆ + v) it can obtain from the 
focal technologies and the potential costs (i.e., T + c). When the size of the patent pool is 
relatively large, it will reduce the bargaining position of the nth party, which translates 
into a lower licensing payment T for the start-up; further, if the start-up can obtain very 
high value from the focal technologies, the start-up will become more sensitive to the 
benefits of the OSS patent pool.31  These two parameters (x and v) will interact to reduce 
the improvement threshold for OSS entry.   
 From equation (1), I know that when the cumulativeness of innovation is high (a 
low θ), the surplus the start-up can obtain from embedding the focal technologies will be 
high (a high v). Thus, the effect of the OSS patent pool will be stronger when both θ is 
low (a high v) and x is large. Similarly, a higher patent ownership concentration (lower n) 
will also lead to a higher value of the focal technologies (a high v) and thus interact with 
                                                 
 
 
31 Conversely, any factor that reduces the value of the nth negotiation will also reduce the effect of the OSS 
patent pool on entry. For instance, it can be shown that if transaction costs associated with each negotiation 
(assumed to be zero in the model) are high, the value at stake in the nth negotiation is lower, and the effect 
of the patent pool will be reduced. This also suggests that the Proposition 1 is entirely driven by the effect 
of the OSS patent pool on the bargaining power of the startup. 
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the effects of the OSS patent pool on the start-up’s entry decision. As formally proved in 
the Appendix B, I have the following propositions. 
Proposition 2:  The threshold for OSS entry Δ∗ will be lower when both the size of the 
patent pool x is large and the cumulativeness of innovation is high.  
Proposition 3:  The threshold for OSS entry Δ∗ will be lower when both the size of the 
patent pool x is large and the concentration of patent ownership is high 
3.3 Research Setting 
 I define an OSS patent pool as a collection of patents pledged to OSS firms for 
royalty-free usage. I focus on one major OSS patent pool—the OSDL’s Patent Commons 
project (denoted as “the Patent Commons” hereafter). In January 2005, IBM pledged 
access to its more than 500 software patents to “any individual, community, or company 
working on or using software that meets the Open Source Initiative (OSI) definition of 
open source software now or in the future.” Subsequent to IBM’s action, several other 
incumbents that participate in OSS software pledged around 30 patents to this pool.32  
“Pledge” in this context means to offer patents royalty-free to any third party that (i) is 
engaging in activities that might otherwise give rise to a claim of patent infringement and 
that (ii) promises not to sue the pool’s beneficiaries (Patent Commons project 2005).33  
IBM announced in its press release that it believed this was the largest patent pledge of 
any kind. The introduction of this pool was expected to confer several benefits upon 
producers of OSS. Participants in the Patent Commons can freely embed technologies 
covered by these patents into their own products without any fear of being sued. Further, 
all pledged patents are explicitly listed on an online public database, and there is no need 
                                                 
 
 
32 Example companies include Computer Associates International Inc. and Open Invention Network, LLC. 
33 For more details, see http://www.patent-commons.org/resources/about_commitments.php. 
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to sign any formal agreement between the Patent Commons and the beneficiary of the 
pool to use them.    
 It is worth noting that, while I found a series of recent patent pledging events 
based on a search of major news outlets (see table 3.1 for a detailed summary of these 
events), my choice of the Patent Commons as the focus of my analysis is guided by 
several factors. First, the patent pool must be economically important in the sense that it 
comprises a large collection of patents. Second, since I am interested in measuring how 
the effect of OSS patent pools vary across different software segments, the patent pool 
must cover multiple software technology markets. Third, because I expect some time lag 
between the announcement of the royalty-free patent pool and entry by software start-
ups, the time window between the patent pool contribution and the end of the sampling 
period should be long enough to observe any significant behavioral changes. Fourth, the 
patent pool needs to specify the contributed patents on a very detailed level, by, for 
example, listing the available patent number. The Patent Commons is the only OSS 
patent pool that met all four of these criteria. Nevertheless, in my empirical analysis I 












Table 3.1 Patent Pledging Events 
 
Event Date Pledging Firm(s) Pledged Patent(s) Potential licensees Notes 
Jan 2005 IBM 
More than 500 specified 
patents (contributed to the 
Patent Commons) 
Anyone developing code under 
an OSI approved license 
This pledging event has been included in the analysis 
Jan 2005 Sun Microsystems 
1670 (unspecified) patents 
related to Sun’s Solaris 
Developer working on any 
approved project under the 
Common Development and 
Distribution License (CDDL) 
Two main criticisms of this pledge: 1. The CDDL doesn’t permit 
mingling its code with code under GNU GPL, which governs Linux. 
This means developers can’t use these patents on Linux – the freely 
granted patents can only enable idea-sharing among programmers for 
Solaris-related projects. 2. Sun’s announcement was too broad and 
didn’t specify these 1670 patents or  respond to any developers’ 




14 patents (contributed to the 
Patent Commons) 
Anyone developing code under 
an OSI approved license 
This pledging event has been included as a control in the analysis. 
Nov 2005 Nokia Any of its patents 
Developers working for  the 
Linux Kernel only 
Criticism: Because of Nokia’s stance on Linux only, developers 
questioned why it did not apply to directly related projects such as 
GNOME and KDE and why it did not apply to application projects that 




Network, founded by 
IBM, Novell, 
Koninklijke Philips 
Electronics, Sony and 
Red Hat 
Any of OIN’s patents 
Any company, institution or 
individual that agrees not to 
assert its patents against the 
Linux operating system or 
certain Linux-related 
applications 
This pledging event has been included in the analysis as a control, as 
many of its patents have been pledged only recently and toward the end 
of the sample period. 
Feb 2007 Blackboard Inc. 
Patent 6,988,138, 7,493,396, 





Anyone contributing to OSS 
projects, OSS initiatives, 
commercially developed open 
source add-on applications to 
proprietary products  
For the commercially developed open source add-on applications to 
proprietary products, if the software’s end license is open, then it is 






 The sample consists of 2,054 US software firms from the 2004 and 2010 editions 
of the CorpTech Directory of Technology Firms34  (denoted as CorpTech 2004/2010 
hereafter) that primarily operate in the prepackaged software industry. I combine this 
sample with data from the National Establishment Time Series (NETS) Database, which 
includes 100,000 US-based firms with primary SIC 7372. The use of two data sources 
reflects constraints with each. The CorpTech data have detailed information on the 
product market segments of firms, but have little time variation, while the NETS data 
have limited product market information but vary over time.  
 As noted above, the focus of my study is on start-up firms. As a result, I restrict 
the sample to firms that were founded after 1990 and that have fewer than 1000 
employees and less than $500 million in annual sales.35  The sampling period is from 
1999 to 2009, with 6 years before the establishment of the Patent Commons and 5 years 
after. I believe this time window is sufficiently long to capture the impact of the Patent 
Commons on OSS entry. 
3.4.2 Identifying Software Segments And The Matching Patent Classes 
 I use the product code classification system embedded in the Gale database 
“PROMT” (Fosfuri et al. 2008) as my primary source to define software market 
                                                 
 
 
34 My choice of 2010 CorpTech data reflects a constraint with the data—I have contacted CorpTech and 
there are no historical data between 2005-2009, the core years of my sample period. The combination of 
CorpTech 2004 and 2010 is to address potential survivor bias. 
35 The results are robust to the use of alternative thresholds for inclusion in my sample. For example, the 
results are robust to an alternative sample of start-ups that includes firms founded after 1990 that have 
fewer than 500 employees and less than $500 million annual sales. 
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segments.36  Because of two major drawbacks of relying only on the PROMT 
classifications (I describe these in further detail in the Appendix C), I further consolidate 
PROMT product categories with CorpTech’s “SOF” product classes to create a PROMT-
CorpTech concordance. Under this concordance, each PROMT product code is 
associated with a detailed set of keywords. The keywords for each product class are used 
to (i) manually assign PROMT product codes to PROMT news articles with missing 
codes and (ii) match software segments with the most relevant patent classes as described 
below. 
 An important part of my data construction involves matching product market 
segments to patents. This allows me to identify both the cumulativeness of innovation 
and the concentration of patent ownership in a software segment. As is well-established 
in the literature, this matching is a challenging undertaking (e.g., Griliches, 1990, 
Silverman 1999). To facilitate the mapping between software products and patents, I 
follow Cockburn and MacGarvie (2006, 2011) and match software patents to CorpTech 
“SOF” product classes37 to create a patent-CorpTech concordance. Because the software 
segments are classified through PROMT categories, in order to create the final mapping 
between software segments and patent classes, I then combine the PROMT-CorpTech 
concordance and patent-CorpTech concordance to form the PROMT-patent concordance. 
The final concordance that I use in the empirical analysis consists of 33 software 
segments matched to 422 patent class-subclass combinations38 (see the Appendix C for a 
detailed discussion of my data construction process). 
                                                 
 
 
36 A few examples of PROMPT product codes are included in Table C.1 in Appendix C. 
37 There are more than 290 software product codes (denoted as SOF) defined by CorpTech Directory. Each 
firm in this directory is associated with a set of self-reported product codes selected from these 290 SOF 
categories. 
38 Table C.3 in Appendix C lists examples of this final concordance between software segments and US 
patent class-subclass combinations. 
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3.5 Measures 
3.5.1 Dependent Variable: OSS entry 
 This variable refers to the number of OSS entrants into software segment j in year 
t. It is to capture the threshold to entry (Δ∗) in my propositions. I use a three-step 
procedure to identify new OSS entry in a software segment based on the press releases of 
the 2,054 firms in the PROMT database. First, following work by Fosfuri et al. (2008) 
and Bessen and Hunt (2007), I searched for a set of keywords within PROMT articles to 
identify articles related to OSS. Appendix D includes the full set of keywords. Second, I 
manually read all search results that included words from the first step to identify new 
OSS product introductions. I identified an article as referring to an introduction of a new 
OSS product when the article indicated that either of the following took place: (i) the 
introduction of a new software product that offered one or more of its module(s)39  under 
an open source license (I label such modules as open source modules); and (ii) the 
introduction of a new version of an existing software product with open source modules. 
Third, to identify entry I kept only the first open source module release by a start-up into 
a segment. In total, I have 242 new OSS product entries made by 85 start-up firms from 
1999 to 2009.40  I aggregated these new OSS product entries by software segment and 
year. The dependent variable is therefore equal to the number of new OSS start-up 
entrants in segment j and year t. The data are structured as a balanced panel. Table 3.2 
includes a brief description of measures and summary statistics for all variables used in 
my empirical analysis. 
                                                 
 
 
39 In software, a module is a part of a program. A software product is composed of one or more modules 
that are linked together but preform different functions (e.g. the calendar module available in the Microsoft 
Office's Outlook). 
40 This procedure implicitly assumes there is no OSS entry by firms prior to 1999. I believe this assumption 
is supported by empirical evidence. For example, SourceForge, a major repository of OSS, was started in 
November 1999. 
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3.5.2 Independent Variables 
 OSS patent pool. This variable refers to the number of patents that belong to the 
Patent Commons that are related to software segment j in year t. It corresponds to the 
OSS patent pool size x in the model. As discussed by Merges and Nelson (1990), it is the 
scope of a patent that determines the patent’s economic and legal significance. In a 
setting with cumulative technologies, broader pool patents will be more likely to 
invalidate blocking patents. To capture these effects, I measure the claims-weighted 
count of patents in the Patent Commons pool related to each software segment.41  I 
further take the logged value of this variable42 to reduce skewness. 
 Cumulativeness. This variable refers to the cumulativeness of innovation within 
segment j in year t and is negatively correlated with the parameter θ in the model. To 
measure this concept I use patents’ backward citations, which provide information about 
“existing ideas used in the creation of new ideas” (Caballero and Jaffe 1993) and indicate 
“some form of cumulative technological impact” (Jaffe et al. 1998). Following Clarkson 
(2005), I measure it based on the average propensity for patents in segment j and year t to 
backward cite patents within the same segment j. This is roughly similar to the way 
economists have measured the cumulative nature of innovation at the firm level, e.g. 
using the extent to which firms self-cite their own patents (Hall et al. 2005). In my 
setting, I proceed as follows. If I sort the N patents within a software segment j 
chronologically (with m=1 being the oldest patent and m=N being the youngest), the 
cumulativeness for each patent n (i.e. the propensity for patent n to cite preceding patents 
within the same segment) is calculated as C = ∑ 189:;< , where =; is a dummy 
variable equal to one if patent n back-cites patent m, and zero otherwise (with both 
                                                 
 
 
41 I also use raw patent counts as a robustness check. The results are qualitatively similar to this claims-
weighted measure. 
42 I add 1 to the variable when taking the log. 
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patents belonging to the same segment), (n-1) is the total number of possible citations, 
and n>1, since C1 is undefined. In other words, the cumulativeness of a focal patent in 
segment j is based on the share of potential backward citations to patents belonging to the 
same segment that are actually cited by the focal patent. The cumulativeness of 
innovation for software segment j is then the average of all N-1 patents’ 
cumulativeness:43  C> = ∑ ∑
?898@AB9CAB8C4 : . This measure varies over time based on the grant 
year of the segment j patents under consideration. Notice that the oldest patents in a 
segment tend to have greater cumulativeness since the potential number of patents that 
can be cited is smaller. As a robustness check, I also used an alternative weighting 
scheme, one that provides relatively lower importance to the cumulativeness measure of 
older patents. As in Clarkson (2005), it is calculated as C> = ∑ ∑ 189B9CAB8CA::/E . For both 
measures, I take the logged value to reduce skewness. 
 Concentration. This variable indicates the extent of concentration of patent 
ownership in a segment and is negatively correlated with the parameter n in the model. 
Following Noel and Schankerman (2006) and Cockburn and MacGarvie (2011), I use the 
four-assignee citation concentration ratio to measure the concentration of patent 
ownership in a software segment. Backward citations indicate the extent to which a 
technological area has already been covered by prior art, so the share of backward 
citations owned by an assignee suggests the extent to which the assignee holds existing 
patented technologies and therefore the importance of negotiating with the assignee. To 
construct this variable, I first calculate the number of citations made by patents in 
segment j up to year t that are held by the cited assignee n (denoted as F>G). Then I 
arranged F>G in descending order. The total citations owned by the four firms that 
                                                 
 
 
43 The average only considers N-1 patents since C1 is undefined. 
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received the top four largest number of citations made by patents in segment j in year t 
(i.e. the top four F>G, where n=1,2,3,4) is  ∑ F>GH< .Thus, the four-assignee citation 
concentration ratio for segment j in year t is calculated as  
∑ 8IJK8CA
GLGM_OPGMGPLIJ, where 
total_citationsjt is the total number of citations made by patents in segment j up to year 
t.44 
3.5.3 Control Variables 
 Sales. One important factor that may correlate with both the behavior of firms 
contributing to the Patent Commons and OSS entry by start-ups is the size of the market 
in software segment j, which is proxied by the total sales in segment j in year t. Because I 
do not have CorpTech data between 2005 and 2009, I use NETS data to measure this 
variable. Roughly 4,500 software firms in the NETS data are assigned to one of the eight-
digit SIC categories (e.g., 73729901) that correspond to eight broad categories in the 
software industry. I compute the total sales for each of the eight SIC categories and then 
map them to the 33 software segments and use the matched sales to approximate the 
overall sales for each segment.   
 Potential licensors. The costs associated with patent thickets are determined not 
only by the concentration of patent ownership in a segment, but also by the total number 
of different parties holding patents essential to a segment. I compute the total number of 
assignees who hold citations made by all patents in segment j up to year t to measure the 
total potential licensors with whom a start-up would have to negotiate. I further use the 
logged value to reduce the skewness of this variable.  
                                                 
 
 
44 I also use an eight-assignee citation concentration ratio as a robustness check. The results are 
qualitatively similar to this four-assignee citation concentration ratio measure. 
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 Total patents. Although I am most interested in two of the most important features 
of patent thickets—the cumulativeness of innovation and the concentration of patent 
ownership, the total number of patents related to a market has also been used as a 
measure of the density of patent thickets (Cockburn and MacGarvie 2011). I add this 
variable as an additional control to isolate this effect, computing the claims-weighted 
patent count related to each software segment j cumulated up to year t. 
 Patent quality. This variable is a control for the quality of patents in the market 
segment j in year t. As has been noted elsewhere, higher quality patents suggest superior 
technological capabilities possessed by existing incumbents in the segment, which leaves 
less room for start-ups to innovate further. This variable is equal to the log value of the 
cumulative stock of citations received by the patents in segment j (adjusted for 
truncations) divided by total number patents in j up to year t. 
 Open Innovation Network (OIN) patents. At the end of the sample period, another 
OSS patent pool institution—OIN—was established. Similar to the Patent Commons, 
OIN offers contractually royalty-free usage of these patents to OSS participants as long 
as users promise not to file suit against software associated with the Linux System.45  I do 
not focus on this pool in my main analysis as it was introduced too late in my sample 
period to have a measureable effect on entry during the sample.46  However, I include it 
as a control. I measure this variable as the claims-weighted patent count of OIN patents 
related to software segment j cumulated up to year t.  
 Standard-setting organization (SSO) patents. As mentioned earlier, another 
important mechanism to address the anti-commons problem is SSOs. Such institutions 
promote coordination of innovation by providing a forum for collective decision-making 
                                                 
 
 
45 For the detailed definition of the Linux system, see 
http://www.openinventionnetwork.com/pat_linuxdef.php. 
46 For the 130 patents contributed to OIN from year 2006 to 2009, 70 percent were contributed in 2008 and 
2009. 
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among firms, facilitating the introduction of standards (Rysman and Simcoe (2008). If 
any patent is incorporated into the standards, the patent owner can gain significant power 
to control the diffusion of such standards and even deter market entry (Shapiro 2001, 
Rysman and Simcoe 2008). To prevent this blocking effect, most SSOs require patent 
holders contributing to the standard to license their patents on “Fair, Reasonable, and 
Non-Discriminatory (FRAND)” terms. Firms can even choose to license their patents 
with FRAND and royalty-free terms. I control for the incidence of SSO patents that are 
licensed royalty-free because I expect that such patents might also have some effect on 
OSS entry.  Therefore, I collect all patents disclosed under royalty-free licenses by the 
major eight SSOs (e.g., IEEE, ITU) from 1971 to 2008 (Rysman and Simcoe 2008)47. I 
compute the claims-weighted patent count of the SSO patents that are distributed under 













                                                 
 
 
47 I am grateful to the generous offer of the SSO patent data set by Tim Simcoe and Christian Catalini. 
These data are available for download under a creative commons license at www.ssopatents.org. 
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Table 3.2 Summary Statistics, Chapter 3 
Variable name  Measure (Segment-year) Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
OSS entry The number of new OSS entrants into segment j in year t 363 .667 1.344 0 11 
OSS patent pool 
Log of Patent Commons’ claims-weighted patent count related to segment j 
cumulated up to year t 
363 2.413 2.936 0 7.911 
Cumulativeness Log of cumulativeness of innovation in segment j up to year t-1 363 .808 .613 .095 3.454 
Cumulativeness_R 
Log of cumulativeness of innovation in segment j up to year t-1 using the 
robustness measure proposed by Clarkson (2005) 
363 .473 .490 .036 2.933 
Concentration Four-assignee citation concentration ratio in segment j up to year t-1 363 0.227 0.075 0.076 0.458 
Potential licensors 
Log of total number of assignees (divided by 100) that are cited by patents in 
segment j up to year t-1 
363 5.559 1.301 1.072 8.407 
OIN patents 
Log of Open Invention Network’s claims-weighted patent count in segment j 
cumulated up to year t 
363 1.125 2.053 0 6.690 
SSO patents 
Log of standard-setting organizations’ claims-weighted patent count in segment j 
cumulated up to year t 
363 1.628 2.118 0 5.908 
Total patents 
Log of total claims-weighted patent count related to segment j cumulated up to 
year t-1 
363 10.817 1.232 6.870 13.486 
Patent quality Log of average quality of patents related to segment j cumulated up to year t-1 363 2.832 .402 1.839 4.051 
Sales Log of total volume of sales by segment j in year t (in Million) 363 7.223 1.523 2.660 9.145 
IBM patents * 
year2003_2004 
Log of IBM’s pre-sampling stock of claims-weighted patent count * 
year2003_2004 dummy, where year2003_2004 dummy turns on for year t = 2003, 
2004 
363 1.209 2.708 0 9.838 
IBM patents * 
after_year2005 
Log of IBM’s pre-sampling stock of claims-weighted patent count * 
after_year2005 dummy, where after_year2005 dummy turns on for year t = 2005, 
2006, …, 2009 
363 3.023 3.584 0 9.838 
IBM patents 
opposed at EPO 
Log of IBM’s patents granted by the European Patent Office (EPO) and opposed 
at EPO related to segment j cumulated up to year t 
363 1.596 .829 0 3.367 
IBM patents * year 
2003 
Log of IBM’s pre-sampling stock of claims-weighted patent count * year2003 
dummy, where year2003 dummy turns on for year t = 2003 
363 .605 2.009 0 9.838 
IBM patents * 
after_year2004 
Log of IBM’s pre-sampling stock of claims-weighted patent count * 
after_year2004 dummy, where after_year2004 dummy turns on for year t = 2004, 
2005, …, 2009 




3.6 Empirical Strategies And Results 
 I motivate the empirical analyses by first investigating the value of patents in the 
OSS patent pool. If the patents in the pool are not valuable, then they will have little 
influence on start-up behavior. Next, I establish a relationship between the changes in 
OSS entry by start-up firms and the changes in the size of the OSS patent pool. I initially 
assume that any changes in the number of pool patents are uncorrelated with 
unobservables influencing new OSS entry; I then relax this assumption through 
instrumental variables estimation. Finally I show that the marginal impact of the OSS 
patent pool is greater in segments where the cumulativeness of innovation is high or the 
concentration of patent ownership is high. 
3.6.1 Are OSS Patent Pools Less Valuable Than Comparable Patents? 
 In my first set of analyses, I examine the quality of patents in the pool relative to a 
comparison group. Following the matching method employed by Jaffe et al. (1993) and 
used by many others, I construct a comparison group of patents by choosing the non-pool 
patents that belong to the same three-digit patent US class as each pool patent and were 
granted either in the 2 years before the grant year or in the 2 years after the grant year of 
each pool patent. Table 3.3 presents how patents in the pools compare to comparable 
patents with respect to forward citations, backward citations, and number of claims. As 
shown in the first row of table 3.3, pool patents’ forward citations are significantly higher 
than those of control patents. However, non-pool control patents have a significantly 
higher number of backward citations and claims. This comparison may suggest that while 
pool patents may cover a narrower technology scope than similar non-pool patents, the 
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pool patents are indeed valuable in the sense that they are less derivative than other 





Table 3.3 Pool Patents Compared to Non-pool Patents 






























Note: 1) Forward citations are the forward citations as of Dec 31, 2009 and are adjusted for truncation 
based on the methods by Hall et al. (2001); 2) Following the matching method employed by Jaffe et al. 
(1993) and followed by many others, I construct the sample of non-pool control patents by choosing the 
non-pool patents that belong to the same three-digit class as each of the pool patents and were granted 
either in the 2 years before the grant year or in the 2 years after the grant year of each pool patent; 3) ***: 
significant at 1%. 
  
                                                 
 
 
48 I acknowledge that just like the patents disclosed in SSOs (Rysman and Simcoe 2008), one other 
potential reason that pool patents’ forward citations are larger than those of comparable patents is the effect 
of the patent pool on improving the awareness of these patents, which makes either OSS or non-OSS 
participants more likely to cite these patents. Thus, the forward citations could be more a measure of 
follow-up innovations building upon the pool patents rather than a measure of patent quality 
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3.6.2. Does The OSS Patent Pool Encourage OSS Entry? 
 Proposition 1 shows how changes in the size of an OSS patent pool influence the 
threshold for entry. The testable implication in my data is how changes in the size of the 
pool influence the number of entrants. My empirical approach is motivated by recent 
research that has studied how patent thickets influence market entry in the software 
industry (e.g., Cockburn and MacGarvie 2011). There are several identification 
challenges in interpreting a relationship between OSS pool patents and OSS entry as a 
causal one. First, the entry rate and the stock of pool patents may be co-determined by 
some unobserved segment-specific factor such as variance in demand across different 
market segments or the stage of the industry life cycle. To mitigate this concern, my 
focus is on the time series variation in the size of patent pools within a software segment 
and its interaction with the segment-specific patent thicket variables. That is, I model new 
product entry using count data models with conditional fixed effects. Suppose the number 
of OSS entrants in software segment j in year t (denoted as Yjt) follows a Poisson process 
with parameter λjt taking the form  λjt = exp(Xjt’β). Also suppose αj is a segment-specific 
and time-constant variable that incorporates unobserved heterogeneity across segments. 
Thus, E(Yjt | Xjt , αj) = λjt = αj exp(Xjt’β), and I assume 
Xjt’β = β1OSS patent pooljt + γ1Salesjt + γ2SegmentPatentsjt-1 + 
γ3PatentThicketjt-1+ γ4OtherFreePatentsjt + τt 
 
(2.10) 
 The vector SegmentPatentsjt-1 includes the Total patentsjt-1, Patent qualityjt-1, and 
Potential licensorsjt-1; the vector PatentThicketjt-1 includes the two patent thicket 
variables cumulativenessjt-1 and concentrationjt-1. The two vectors are lagged by one year 
to allow for any lagged effects on OSS entry.  The vector OtherFreePatentsjt represents 
the patents from OIN and SSOs—OIN patentsjt and SSO patentsjt. τt includes 10 year 
dummies to control for time-varying factors that may influence OSS entry. The model is 
then estimated using maximum likelihood with robust standard errors clustered at the 
segment level. I am interested in the estimate for β1 which, if positive, supports 
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proposition 1. To test the robustness of my results, I use different specifications by 
adding the above controls incrementally.  
 Table 3.4 presents the estimation results for specification (2.10). Column (1) 
shows the simplest specification with only segment sales as a control as well as with 
segment and year fixed effects. I include sales in all specifications because both demand 
and market competition within a segment are important determinants of start-up entry.49  
The coefficient in column (1) suggests that a 10% increase in the OSS patent pool’s 
patent claims related to a software segment is associated with a 1.4% increase in OSS 
entry in that segment. Results are robust when I add controls such as the segment’s patent 
size and quality (the vector SegmentPatentsjt-1), the segment’s patent thicket density (the 
vector PatentThicketjt-1), and the size of the patents included in other patent pool-like 
institutions (the vector OtherFreePatentsjt). I note that while increases in the size of the 
OSS patent pool are associated with OSS entry, increases in SSO patents are not. I 
speculate that this may reflect differences in the licensing requirements for patent pool 
and SSO patents: in particular, while users of the patent pool pledge not to sue the pool’s 
beneficiaries, licensees of SSO patents have no such requirements. Licensees of SSO 
patents may see the value of complementary IPRs increase in value, which may increase 
their incentives to defend their technologies more aggressively. Thus, increases in SSO 






                                                 
 
 
49 I have experimented with other controls for market demand such as the number of incumbents. 




Table 3.4 Conditional Fixed-effect Poisson 
Dependent variable: OSS entry 
 (1) (2) (3) 





























OIN patents   
-.057 
(.076) 
SSO patents   
-.015 
(.074) 
Cumulativeness   
1.152 
(1.134) 
Concentration   
-9.348 
(6.818) 
Observations 286 286 286 
Log pseudolikelihood -229.734 -229.201 -227.777 
Notes: 1) Robust standard errors, clustered by market segment, are in parentheses. 2) * significant at 10%, 
** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 3) The number of observations is lower than 363 (i.e., the 
number of observations listed in Table 1) because of the use of conditional fixed effects Poisson models, 
which drops market segments without OSS entry over the entire sample period. 4) All regressions include 








 One potential concern with the above specification is that there may exist 
unobserved changes specific to the software segment that are correlated both with 
contributions to the pool and OSS entry. One such possibility is if product market growth 
is inadequately controlled for by the Sales variable. To address this concern, I use a 
moment-based count data model with instrumental variables and solve the moment 
conditions through Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation. That is, since 
the conditional mean E(Yjt | Xjt, αj) is equal to αjexp(Xjt’β), it implicitly defines the 
following regression model (Windmeijer and Santos Silva 1997):  
Yjt = αjexp(Xjt’β) + ujt = αjexp(β1OSS patent pooljt + γ1Salesjt + 
γ2SegmentPatentsjt-1 + γ3PatentThicketjt-1+ γ4OtherFreePatentsjt + τt) + ujt  
= µjtαj + ujt         
(3.12) 
 where µjt = exp(β1OSS patent pooljt + γ1Salesjt + γ2SegmentPatentsjt-1 + 
γ3PatentThicketjt-1 + γ4OtherFreePatentsjt + τt) and ujt is the error term. OSS patent 
pooljt is treated as a potentially endogenous variable. Suppose Xjtγ = γ1Salesjt + 
γ2SegmentPatentsjt-1 + γ3PatentThicketjt-1 + γ4OtherFreePatentsjt + τt, then Xjt is assumed 
to be exogenous. Following Windmeijer (2000) and Kim and Marschke (2005), I use 
Wooldridge's quasi-differencing transformation (Wooldridge 1997) to remove the 
segment-specific fixed effect, and obtain the following moment condition: 
Q RS>G TUIJVIJ −
UIJ@A
VIJ@AWX = 0  (3.12) 
where Zjt includes the set of exogenous variable Xjt and a set of instruments for OSS 
patent pooljt as detailed below. As noted by Wooldridge (1997), one drawback for this 
moment condition is that the estimates of the associated coefficients tend to go infinity if 
the explanatory variables contain only nonnegative values, as is the case for my data. One 
solution to this problem proposed by Windmeijer (2000) is to transform Zjt as deviations 
from the overall sample mean; therefore, I transform all Zjt to S>G − Y̅, where             Y̅ =

:' ∑ ∑ Y>G'G<:>< .  
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 The first instrumental variable (IV) is the pre-sampling stock of patents at the end 
of 1997 held by the major contributor to the Patent Commons—IBM—across the 33 
software segments. This instrument is designed to capture IBM’s propensity to pledge 
patents across different segments. I expect that incumbents tend to contribute patents to 
segments where they have accumulated stocks of patents for blocking rivals and 
facilitating negotiations. A shortcoming with this variable is that its variance is cross-
sectional, which would result in its being eliminated by the quasi-differencing method. 
Thus, I further interact the pre-sampling stock of patents with two time dummies 
associated with the formation of the OSS patent pool. The first time dummy (denoted as 
year2003_2004) is turned on for year 2003 and year 2004. The motivation to use this 
time dummy is driven by the observation that on March 7, 2003 IBM was sued by the 
SCO Group, which asserted that the Linux system embedded by IBM infringed on SCO’s 
UNIX System V source code. This was the first major IPR enforcement lawsuit targeting 
OSS that attracted significant publicity and as such, it is expected to influence IBM’s 
patent contribution decision. The second time dummy (denoted as afteryear2005) is set to 
be equal to 1 after 2005. This time dummy is designed to reflect the concentration of 
patent-pledging events for the OSS community during 2005. As described in the 
Appendix B and also shown by Alexy and Reitzig (2011), following the publication of a 
report by Open Source Risk Management (OSRM) that Linux had been infringing 283 
patents, a series of non-assertion announcements by software industry incumbents came 
out beginning in 2005. Further, as suggested by Alexy and Reitzig (2011), these 
incumbents had strong incentives to coordinate with each other to avoid the hold-up 
problems for the OSS community, resulting in a cluster of non-assertion announcements. 
Thus, I believe that interacting the pre-sampling stock of IBM patents with the timing of 
these two events will capture any variance in the propensity of IBM to contribute patents 
to this pool. 
 88
 The second instrumental variable is the cumulated number of IBM patents that 
were opposed at the European Patent Office (EPO) up to year t and related to software 
segment j (denoted as IBM patents opposed at EPO). The logic to this instrument is that 
firms will contribute patents that have the potential to block OSS innovation. Therefore, 
measures that are correlated with the propensity for IBM to create blocking patents 
related to a software product market segment over time are, therefore, potential 
instruments. I argue that one proxy for this propensity is IBM’s patents that are opposed 
at the European Patent Office (EPO). Different from US legal procedures, the EPO 
allows patents granted at the EPO to be opposed up to nine months after the grant date 
and at a much lower cost than that of patents opposed through formal legal procedures. 
Using this instrument has two advantages. First, since the opposition is filed at the EPO, 
it should not be correlated with new OSS product entries in the US market. Second, since 
the opposition needs to be filed within 9 months from the grant of a patent, the truncation 
issue associated with the lag between the grant date of a patent and the timing of its 
impact on innovation is far less serious than it is with other similar procedures such as 
litigation events.50    
 Table 3.5 presents the GMM estimation results where I instrument for OSS patent 
pooljt using the above instruments. To improve identification, I also add the square of the 
instruments described above (Gallant 1987). I also test for the validity of all instruments 
used. As before, I use different specifications by adding the controls incrementally. That 
is, column (1) in table 3.5 provides the estimates using only sales as controls; column (2) 
further adds the vector SegmentPatent; column (3) further adds the vector 
                                                 
 
 
50 More specifically, as has been noted by Hall et al. (2003), because oppositions must be filed within 9 
months of a patent grant, the average lag between applying for a patent and the filing of opposition request 
is relatively tight; in contrast, other legal procedures such as litigation and patent re-examinations can be 
initiated at any time during the lifetime of a patent, which results in greater variance in the distribution of 
these procedural lags. 
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PatentThicket
51. As I can see from column (1) to column (3), the estimated direct impact 
of the OSS patent pool is consistently and significantly positive across all specifications, 
though inclusion of  SegmentPatent and PatentThicket as controls reduces the magnitude 
of the effect. Note that since the use of the conditional fixed effects model excludes 
market segments without OSS entry over the sample period, I also present comparable 
GMM estimates obtained by dropping these segments. The results are presented in 
column (4) to column (6) of Table 3.5, and are consistent and similar to the estimates 
based on the full sample.  
  
                                                 
 
 
51 I was not able to add the vector OtherFreePatents, as it leads to non-convergent results. 
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Sample dropping the segments 
without OSS entry 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 




































































Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 363 363 363 286 286 286 
Over-identification 













Notes: 1) The full set of IVs include IBM patents*year2003_2004, IBM patents*afteryear2005, square of IBM patents*year2003_2004, square of IBM 
patents*afteryear2005, IBM opposed patents at EPO, and square of IBM opposed patents at EPO. 2) Robust standard errors, clustered by market segment, are in 
parentheses. 3) * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.  4) Year dummies include year2001_2002, year2003, year2004, year2005, 
year2006, year2007, and year2008_2009. The reason for not  using the full set of ten year dummies is that including more year dummies leads to non-





 I probe the validity of the instruments by first examining the power of the 
instruments, by using the F-test from an auxiliary first stage ordinary least square (OLS) 
regression of the endogenous variable against the same set of IVs and exogenous 
variables. As shown in table 3.6, the F-statistics on the coefficients of my instruments 
range from 35.17 to 83.63, depending upon the specification, and are all statistically 
significant, which suggests that the instruments have some power in explaining the 
endogenous variable. I also perform the Hansen J statistic to test the over-identification 
restrictions. The results are in the last row of table 3.5. All tests fail to reject the null that 
the instruments used are uncorrelated with the error term across all specifications. I also 
test the validity of a subset of the instruments. In particular, I assume that the stock of 
IBM patents opposed at EPO is exogenous, and test the validity of the interactions 
between the pre-sampling stock of IBM patents with the year dummies.52 As shown in 
table 3.6, based on the C-test statistic I fail to reject the null that the IVs—the pre-
sampling stock of IBM patents times year2003_2004 and its square and the pre-sampling 
stock of IBM patents times afteryear2005 and its square—are valid across all 
specifications.53  
 As an additional robustness check, another set of IVs has been constructed: I 
interact the pre-sampling stock of IBM patents with a year 2003 dummy (which is set to 
be 1 for year 2003 and 0 for other years) and an afteryear2004 dummy (which is set to be 
1 after year 2004 and 0 for other years); I use these two plus their squares and IBM 
                                                 
 
 
52 I implement a C-test to evaluate the exogeneity of this subset of IVs, with the null hypothesis that they 
are valid instruments. That is, I treat the full model with the three IVs and their squares as the restricted and 
fully efficient regression; I use the model with the IBM patents opposed at EPO and its square as IVs as the 
unrestricted, inefficient but consistent regression. 
53 Alternatively, I also performed a test on the validity of the subset of instruments represented by the stock 
of IBM patents opposed at the EPO, and this time assume that the interactions between the pre-sampling 
stock of IBM patents and the year dummies are exogenous. Based on the C-test statistic, I fail to reject the 
null that the stock of IBM patents opposed at the EPO is valid across all specifications. 
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opposed patents at EPO plus its square as IVs for GMM estimation using the same 
model. The results are similar and presented in table 3.7. 
 Finally, to further boost confidence in my results, I also implement a falsification 
exercise. The intuition is that, given the theoretical predictions, I should not observe a 
positive effect of the OSS pool on start-up entry based on proprietary software product 
entry. I use the press releases of the 2,054 firms in the PROMT database to identify new 
proprietary software product entry. To precisely identify new proprietary products related 
to each segment, I focus only on introduction events associated with PROMT product 
codes. For each start-up, I include only the firm’s first product in a segment to capture 
entry. This results in 2,384 proprietary product entry events from 2002 to 2009. I then 
aggregated these by software segment and year. I also adjust for a change in the 
assignment of product codes during the sample. Specifically, between 2007 and 2009 I 
found that application-related software products were systematically assigned to a higher 
product code level in the PROMT database (specifically, they were assigned to 7372400, 
Applications Software). This forced me to combine several application segments 
together, leaving me with 29 software segments (rather than the baseline 33 segments) in 
total. As shown in table 3.8, the results suggest that there is no significantly positive 
effect of the pool on entry using this set of products.   
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Table 3.6 C-test, First Stage Results of OLS IV Regressions 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
GMM Estimates  







First Stage Results of OLS IV Regressions  
























































Notes: 1) The full set of IVs include: IBM patents*year2003_2004, IBM patents*afteryear2005, square of 
IBM patents*year2003_2004, square of IBM patents*afteryear2005, IBM opposed patents in EPO, and 
square of IBM opposed patents in EPO. 2) The C-test is to assess the exogeneity of IBM 
patents*year2003_2004, IBM patents*afteryear2005, square of IBM patents*year2003_2004, and square of 
IBM patents*afteryear2005 as IVs with the null hypothesis that they are valid instruments. 3) The C-test 
statistic is computed as the difference between two J statistics from GMM estimates: that for the (restricted, 
fully efficient) regression using the full set of IVs versus that for the (unrestricted, inefficient but 
consistent) regression using the smaller set of IVs including IBM opposed patents in EPO and square of 
IBM opposed patents in EPO. 4) The first stage OLS IV Regressions are used as auxiliary regressions to 
test for weak IVs, as there is no such test in using the GMM estimator. 5) Robust standard errors, clustered 















Table 3.7 GMM Estimates Using Different Sets of IVs 
 
 




Specification with two-way interactions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
OSS patent pool 









































































SSO patents     
-.111 
(.129) 
Seven year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 363 363 363 363 363 
Over-identification 











Notes: 1) The full set of IVs include: IBM patents*year2003, IBM patents*afteryear2004, square of IBM 
patents*year2003, square of IBM patents*afteryear2004, IBM opposed patents at EPO, square of IBM 
opposed patents at EPO. 2) Robustness standard errors, clustered by market segment, are in parentheses. 3) 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 4) Adding more controls in specification 
















Table 3.8 Falsification Test, Impact on Proprietary Software Products 
 
Dependent variable  
New proprietary software product 
entry 
 (1) (2) (3) 
























OIN patents   
.034 
(.049) 
SSO patents   
-.116** 
(.052) 
Observations 232 232 232 
Log pseudolikelihood -496.316 -464.505 -451.968 
Notes: 1) Robust standard errors, clustered by market segment, are in parentheses. 2) * significant at 10%, 










3.6.3. Does The Effect Of The OSS Patent Pool Vary With The Patent Thicket? 
 In this section, I investigate how the impact of the OSS patent pool varies with the 
cumulativeness of innovation and the concentration of patent ownership in a market 
segment. I begin by examining whether the impact of the OSS patent pool is higher when 
the cumulativeness of innovation in a segment is high. The specification for Xjt’β 
becomes 
Xjt’β = β1OSS patent pooljt + β2OSS patent pooljt*cumulativenessjt-1 +γ1Salesjt + 
γ2SegmentPatentsjt-1 + γ3PatentThicketjt-1 + γ4OtherFreePatentsjt + τt. 
 
(3.13) 
 To test the direct impact of the OSS patent pool (proposition 1), I present the 
marginal effect of the OSS patent pool when other variables are at their mean level. The 
propositions 2 and 3 state how changes in patent pools, cumulativeness, and 
concentration influence the threshold for entry. The testable implications in my data are 
how changes in each of these variables influence the number of entrants. Thus, if the 
marginal effect of patent pools on entry is greater when cumulativeness is high, this is 
supportive of proposition 2. Similarly, if the marginal effect of patent pools on entry is 
greater when concentration is high, this is supportive of proposition 3. To capture the 
interaction effects as suggested by proposition 2, I compute the marginal effect of the 
pool when cumulativeness is at high and low levels, and test whether the marginal effect 
of the OSS patent pool is significantly different at these two levels. As before, I employ 
different specifications by adding the sets of four controls incrementally and use an 
alternative measure of cumulativeness to probe the robustness of the results. 
 As shown in columns (1)-(3) in table 3.9, a 10% increase in the pool’s patent 
claims is associated with a 2.2%-3% increase in OSS entry, with the effect computed at 
the average level of cumulativeness of innovation. Further, while the marginal effect of 
the OSS patent pool is insignificant when evaluated at the 10th percentile of the 
cumulativeness, the effects are statistically and economically significant when evaluated 
at the 90th percentile. Specifically, a 10% increase in the pool’s patent claims is 
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associated with a 3.8%-5.6% increase in OSS entry when cumulativeness of innovation is 
at its 90th percentile. A test for the difference of the two marginal effects (at the 10th and 
90th percentiles) is statistically significant. Meanwhile, all the estimates are stable across 
all specifications and across different measures of cumulativeness of innovation.54 These 
results suggest that the impact of the OSS patent pool is greater when the cumulativeness 
of innovation is high, providing evidence in support of proposition 2. 
 The next step is to explore how the impact of the OSS patent pool is influenced by 
variation in the concentration of patent ownership. The specification can be written as 
Xjt’β = β1OSS patent pooljt + β3OSS patent pooljt* concentrationjt-1+γ1Salesjt + 
γ2SegmentPatentsjt-1 + γ3PatentThicketjt-1 + γ4OtherFreePatentsjt + τt.        
 
(3.14) 
 The empirical results for this specification are shown in columns (4)-(6) in table 
3.9. While the marginal effect of the OSS patent pool is insignificant when concentration 
is at its 10th percentile or mean value, a 10% increase in the OSS patent pool’s patent 
claims is associated with a 1.3%-1.7% increase in OSS entry when concentration is at its 
90th percentile. Meanwhile, excluding the simplest specification with only sales as 
control, the test for the difference of marginal effects of the OSS patent pool between 
concentration evaluated at the 10th percentile and the 90th percentile is statistically 
significant at the 10% level. Thus, my results provide evidence in support of proposition 
3.  
 To present a more complete picture of how the impact of the OSS patent pool 
varies with cumulativeness of innovation and concentration of patent ownership, I present 
results including the two sets of interactions together. These estimates are presented in 
columns (7)-(9) in table 3.9. A 10% increase in the pool’s patent claims is associated with 
a 4.5%-4.8% increase in OSS entry when the cumulativeness of innovation is at its 90th 
                                                 
 
 
54 I also use a robust measure of cumulativeness. The results are very consistent with the baseline measure 
for the cumulativeness.  
 98
percentile; the marginal effect of the pool is significantly different at the 1% level when 
evaluated at high and low levels of cumulativeness. While in this specification the 
interaction between the OSS patent pool and concentration of patent ownership becomes 
insignificant, the impact of the OSS patent pool is still statistically significant and 
positive when evaluated at the 90th percentile of concentration and the sign of the 
interaction’s coefficient is positive across specifications. However, there is no statistically 
significant difference between the marginal effects evaluated at the 10th and 90th 
percentiles of concentration. Thus, while the qualitative nature of my results is similar 
when including cumulativeness and concentration together, the statistical significance of 
the concentration result is weaker. This is likely caused by the multicollinearity between 














                                                 
 
 
55 In the pooled sample, the simple correlation coefficient between the two interaction terms is 0.66. 
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Table 3.9 Conditional Fixed-effect Poisson, Add Two-way Interactions 
Dependent variable: OSS 
entry 
Interaction with Cumulativeness of 
Innovation 
Interaction with Concentration of 
Patent Ownership 
Interaction with Cumulativeness of 
Innovation and with Concentration of 
Patent Ownership 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 


































OSS patent pool * 
Concentration 
































































































































Observations 286 286 286 286 286 286 286 286 286 
Log pseudolikelihood -227.205 -225.971 -224.103 -228.567 -227.599 -226.762 -224.319 -224.186 -223.893 
Marginal Effects 


















































Statistic for the test of the 
difference between high 















OSS patent pool 
(concentration =10%) 













OSS patent pool 
(concentration =90%) 













Statistic for the test of the 
difference between high 
and low concentration 
(p-value) 













Notes: 1) Robust standard errors, clustered by market segment, are in parentheses. 2) * significant at 10%, 
** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 3) The number of observations is lower than in Table 1 because 
of the use of conditional fixed effects Poisson models, which drop market segments in which there is no 
new product entry over my sample period. 4) The statistic for the test of the difference of marginal effect of 
an OSS patent pool between the cumulativeness of innovation/the concentration of patent ownership at the 
10th percentile and at the 90th percentile is distributed as chi-square, and the p-value is shown in the 
parentheses. 5) All regressions include market and year fixed effects. 
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 To evaluate how potential omitted variables may influence my results, I again 
examine the robustness of my results to the use of instrumental variables. I interact each 
of the original instruments (for the size of the OSS patent pool) with cumulativeness and 
with patent ownership concentration to form the instruments for the two interaction 
variables. The estimated results are shown in table 3.10. Columns (1) through (3) provide 
estimates using the full sample. The estimated coefficients for the two interaction 
variables remain significantly positive across all specifications. For robustness, the 
estimates from columns (4) through (6) are based on a sample that excludes market 
segments without OSS entry during the study period; the coefficients for the two 
interactions are still significantly positive and stable across all specifications. While the 
combined empirical evidence from tables 3.9 and 3.10 largely confirms proposition 3, it 
seems to suggest that the interaction between the OSS patent pool and concentration of 
patent ownership is not as strong as its interaction with cumulativeness.  
 I also explore the impact of the OSS patent pool when both the cumulativeness of 
innovation and concentration of patent ownership in a segment are high. The detailed 
empirical results are shown in table 3.11. For segments with both cumulativeness of 
innovation and concentration at high levels (at the 90th percentile), a 10% increase in the 
pool’s patent claims is associated with a 7.5%-8.8% increase of new OSS entry; this 
marginal effect is significantly greater than that when cumulativeness of innovation or 










Sample dropping the segments 
without OSS entry 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 































































































































Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 

















Notes: 1) The full set of IVs include: IBM patents*year2003_2004, IBM patents*afteryear2005, square of 
IBM patents*year2003_2004, square of IBM patents*afteryear2005, IBM opposed patents at EPO, and 
square of IBM opposed patents at EPO. 2) Robust standard errors, clustered by market segment, are in 
parentheses. 3) * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.  4) Year dummies include 
year2001_2002, year2003, year2004, year2005, year2006, year2007, and year2008_2009. Including more 
year dummies would lead to non-convergence of the GMM estimator. 5) I am unable to include OIN 











Table 3.11 Conditional Fixed-effect Poisson, Add Two-way/Three-way Interactions 
Dependent variable: OSS entry (1) (2) (3) 









































































OIN patents   
-.074 
(.068) 
SSO patents   
-.021 
(.069) 
Observations 286 286 286 
Log pseudolikelihood -222.779 -222.294 -221.829 
Marginal Effects 







[1] OSS patent pool (cumulativeness=10%, 















[3] OSS patent pool (cumulativeness=90%, 















Statistic for the test of the difference between [1] and 







Statistic for the test of the difference between [2] and 







Statistic for the test of the difference between [3] and 







Notes: 1) Robust standard errors, clustered by market segment, are in parentheses. 2) * significant at 10%, ** 
significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 3) The above estimation is based on the specification Xjt’β = β1OSS patent 
pooljt + β2OSS patent pooljt*cumulativenessjt-1 + β3OSS patent pooljt* concentrationjt-1 + δ1OSS patent 
pooljt*cumulativenessjt-1*concentrationjt-1 + δ2cumulativenessjt-1*concentrationjt-1 + γ1Salesjt + γ2SegmentPatentsjt-1 + 
γ3PatentThicketjt-1 + γ4OtherFreePatentsjt + τt. 4) The difference between [1] and [2] / between [1] and [3] / between 
[2] and [3] is insignificant and not included in the table due to the limited space. 5) All regressions include market and 
year fixed effects.  
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3.7 Conclusions 
 The empirical evidence demonstrates that increases in the size of an OSS patent 
pool related to a software segment are associated with increases in OSS entry by start-up 
software firms in that segment.56 Furthermore, the impact of the OSS patent pool is 
magnified when two features of patent thickets are present in the segment: 
cumulativeness of innovation and concentration of patent ownership. I observe a 
particularly strong relationship between the size of the patent pool and OSS start-ups’ 
entry in segments with high cumulativeness of innovation; the marginal effect of the pool 
is also greater when concentration is high, although this result is not robust across all 
specifications.  
 In conclusion, my results suggest that OSS patent pools may facilitate markets for 
technology by strengthening a startup’s negotiating position against incumbents with 
potentially blocking patents. Indeed, by reducing entry costs and the associated incentives 
for startups to operate in the open source world, OSS patent pools appear to stimulate the 
open source innovation activities of entrepreneurial firms in industries characterized by 
dense patent thickets and concentrated property rights. 
 The study analyzes the impact of patent pools on the behavior of those firms 
whose entry decisions are most likely to be affected by the change in licensing and 
negotiation costs: start-up firms considering entry as an OSS competitor. The 
introduction of OSS patent pools may have secondary implications for two groups of 
firms that I do not study: large firms and those who sell software under a traditional 
proprietary license. Understanding the implications of OSS patent pools on these other 
                                                 
 
 
56 A natural and interesting extension to this study is to look at how the size of the OSS patent pool 
influences the survival rate of OSS firms. However, of the firms introducing new OSS products in the 
sample, only one firm exited before the end of the sampling period. As a result, there is insufficient 
variance in my data to measure the impact of the OSS patent pool on the survival of start-up firms who 
produce OSS. 
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groups will have important implications for the rate and direction of inventive activity in 
software, and quantifying these implications is an important question for future research.  
 This study deepens our understanding of the role of patent pools. While prior 
work has shown that the introduction of traditional patent pools can lead to a decline in 
innovative activity among both licensors and licensees (Lampe and Moser 2010, Joshi 
and Nerkar 2011), I find that the introduction of OSS patent pools stimulates the 
innovative activity of a key group, start-ups. I speculate that this difference may reflect 
the requirements of use for the OSS patent pool; namely OSS pool patents are offered 
royalty-free and beneficiaries are required not to sue firms producing OSS. As noted 
above, the absence of this latter requirement may be one reason for my inability to find a 
measurable impact of standard setting organizations’ patents on OSS entry. However, 
more research is needed to understand how licensing requirements across the two types 




FOR CHAPTER 2: FURTHER DETAILS ON DATA 
CONSTRUCTION AND EXAMPLES OF PROJECTS IN THE 
TREATED GROUPS 
 
 SRDA contains information about each project’s main functionality and its 
intended adopters. This information includes fields such as topics, descriptions, and 
operating systems. All topics on SRDA are organized in a hierarchical structure. An OSS 
“topic” in SRDA is defined to be the domain for the set of problems addressed by the 
OSS. There are 18 top-level topics in total and examples include “Internet,” 
“Communications,” and “System.” For each top-level topic, there are several levels of 
sub-topics; for example, under the top-level topic “System,” there are second-level topics 
such as “Operating System Kernels” and “Distributed Computing.” Third-level topics are 
also sometimes provided under a second-level topic. An OSS “description” in SRDA 
details the OSS project’s more specific features; for example, HomePlayer, one of the 
most popular projects on SourceForge, has a description that reads “HomePlayer is an 
extension of the FreePlayer software provided by the French Internet provider Free 
(www.free.fr). It adds a lot of functionality like hard-disk browsing, meteo, tv program, 
etc.” Therefore, I expect that the combination of “topic” and “description” will provide 
me with sufficient information to determine the treatment groups for the difference-in-
difference estimation. As I mention in greater detail below, I search both the “topic” and 
“description” fields for the key words used to determine each treatment group. Last, I 
also use SRDA’s information on “operating system” for projects. An OSS “operating 
system” describes on which platform the software can run. 
 106
 Identifying projects that show technology overlap with the focal litigated 
technology. As noted in the body of the text, for the SCO v. IBM case I wish to identify 
Linux kernel projects. To identify such projects, I search the “topic” field in SRDA for 
the key words “Linux” and “kernel.” One set that largely satisfies this criterion consists 
of projects with the topic “Linux” under a higher level topic “Operating System Kernels” 
(i.e., “Linux” projects within the set of “Operating System Kernels” projects). Examples 
of projects for which “Linux_kernel” is equal to 1 are shown in the below Table A.1. The 
description field for one such project “TinyLinux” reads “TinyLinux is a small Linux 
Distribution for i386 derived from SuSE 6.4. In the base version it just contains the things 
which are necessary to run Linux...” 
 As noted in the main body of the chapter, for the FireStar/DataTern v. Red Hat 
case I wish to identify projects that use object-relational mapping technology. So I search 
the “description” field for all OSS projects from SRDA for key words “object,” 
“relational,” and “mapping.” Then I create a dummy variable “object_relational”: if the 
project’s “description” field includes these key words, I set the dummy variable 
“object_relational” to be 1; otherwise I set it to be 0. Examples of projects for which 
“object_relational” is equal to 1 are shown in Table A.2. The description field of one 
such project “JGrinder Object/Relational Mapping” notes that “JGrinder is largely an 
Object to Relational mapping solution for providing Java persistence. It has been used for 
high volume, high availability solutions.” 
 Identifying business projects that are specific to the focal litigated platform. For 
the SCO v. IBM case, I utilize a two-step method to construct the variable 
business_app_on_Linux. The first step is to identify the set of all types of OSS projects 
primarily intended for use by firms: I search the “description” field of all OSS projects 
and identify projects including the key words “enterprise,” “business,” “company,” 
“ERP,” and “CRM.” I also searched the “topic” field of OSS and use this to identify 
topics with the key word “point-of-sale.” I identify projects with any of these key words 
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as enterprise applications. Second, each OSS project from SRDA also provides a field 
called “operating system” that details the platforms on which a project can run. I identify 
the set of projects can only run on Linux based on this field. The treated group called 
“business_app_on_Linux” is composed of projects that lie at the intersection of the sets 
created by these two steps.   That is, for projects that lie within this intersection, I set the 
value of a dummy variable “business_app_on_Linux” to be 1; otherwise I set it to be 0. 
Examples of projects for which “business_app_on_Linux” is equal to 1 are shown in 
Table A.3. The description field of one such project named “gShop” states that “gShop is 
a complete point of sale application that can be customized to suit most types of 
businesses.” 
 For the FireStar/DataTern v. Red Hat case, to identify the set of projects specific 
to JBoss, I search the “description” field of all OSS projects from SRDA for the key word 
“JBoss.” Accordingly, I create a dummy variable “JBoss_related”: for projects from the 
set of JBoss-related projects, I set the variable “JBoss_related” to be 1; otherwise I set it 
to be 0. Examples of projects for which “JBoss_related” is equal to 1 are shown in Table 
A.4. The description field of one such project “Redpos” states that “A simple and rock 
solid Point Of Sale (POS) application. The POS is based on the JBoss MicroKernel, has a 
flexible graphical interface and can easily be connected to different backoffice/ERP 










Table A.1 Examples in the treated group “Linux_kernel” 
Project 
id 
Project name Project Description 
5907 Linux/APUS 
Kernel 
Linux Kernel for PowerPC equipped Amiga Computers. 
11125 TinyLinux TinyLinux is a small Linux Distribution for i386 derived from 
SuSE 6.4. In the base version it just contains the things which are 
necessary to run Linux. Therefore the base package is rather 
small and requires approx. 7MB. 
33589 system call 
tracker 
A linux kernel module and supporting user space environment 
which allow interception and modifying system calls that match 
user defined criteria. Think of it as strace on steroids. 
 
 
Table A.2 Examples in the treated group “object_relational” 
Project 
id 




JGrinder is largely an Object to Relational mapping solution for 
providing Java persistence. It has been used for high volume, 
high availability solutions. 
8706 Osage - 
Persistence Plus 
XML 
JDBC-based Object-Relational mapping system. It maps Java 
objects to RDBMS. It generates SQL for retrieving, saving, and 
deleting objects. It does XML<=>RDBMS. It autogenerates 
keys, maintains dependent objects and relations. 
48132 Cayenne Cayenne is an object-relational mapping framework written in 
Java. It provides tools and libraries to implement object 
persistence on top of relational databases. Cayenne consists of 















Table A.3 Examples in the treated group “business_app_on_Linux” 
Project 
id 
Project name Project Description 
8854 VPrice VPrice is a cost price calculator for Linux. It is designed for 
producers who need to have their product prices calculated 
“on the fly”. 
10974 LnxFire LnxFire is a Linux & Gnome firewall tool for the small 
business owner. Use the firewall creation wizard to quickly 
create a basic firewall. Featuring dynamic rule modifiers, 
proactive monitoring, reporting, email alerts and auto 
lockout of port scanners. 
16639 gShop gShop is a complete point of sale application that can be 




Table A.4 Examples in the treated group “JBoss_related” 
Project 
id 
Project name Project Description 
46485 JBoss JBuilder 
OpenTool 
Voyager JBoss OpenTool is an OT for JBuilder 6 Enterprise 
Edition. It integrates the JBoss application server the same 
way other application server are already integrated. 
Development and support was stopped since JBuilderX 





This plugin gives us the ability to integrate JBoss 3.0.x with 
Jetty 4.x into IDEA.  The objective is to have an easy way 
to test and deploy web apps.  Future versions of the plugin 
will support the combo of JBoss/Tomcat. 
104726 Redpos A simple and rock solid Point Of Sale (POS) application. 
The POS is based on the JBoss MicroKernel, has a flexible 
graphical interface and can easily be connected to different 





FOR CHAPTER 3: PROOFS IN SECTION 3.2 
Proof for Lemma 1 
 As assumed, ∆ is distributed uniformly and gΔ = 1, so G!Δ # = Δ , G!∆# =
∆. Given ∆,  = 1 − ∆, I have: 
max' !, , "Δ # = max' ( 1 − ∆ −  * ∆.' ,Δ +  ∙ ∆.'*
 
*   
=max' * (  − ∆ − ∆.' ,Δ +  ∙ ∆.'*
 
*  
Let’s denote ∆  as ∆ and since it is more convenient we compute the first 
order condition with respect to ∆s, 
max∆. !, , "Δ #=max∆. * ] − E  −  − ∆ + ∆.
4
E  + ∆^ + ∆.* * ∙
1 − ∆ +  
0_
0∆. = * − + ∆ +  + `∆.5ab* + ∆.*
 
* ∙ −  
The first order condition 
0_
0∆. = 0 is equal to −∆ + 2 + Δ =0.  
 That is, the optimal ∆ for a given correct belief Δ  is: 
∆∗= `5 2 + Δ   (B.1) 
Since T= 1 − ∆ + , the corresponding T for a given correct belief Δ  is 
 =  − !2 + Δ # +      (B.2) 
The unique sequential equilibrium in pure strategies can be obtained from the 
following two conditions, where the first condition (equation (B.3)) describes the optimal 
!, , "Δ # given a Δ  and the second condition (equation (B.4)) describes how the 
decision of OSS entry is determined by a given : 
∗ =  − !2 + Δ∗# +   (B.3) 
Δ∗ = ∗ +  −   (B.4) 
Combining these two conditions, we have 
Δ∗ =  − !2 + Δ∗# +  +  −     
Therefore, the optimal improvement level  Δ∗ for entry has the following form: 
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Δ∗ = 1 +  +  −  −   (B.5) 
Further, to satisfy Δ∗ ∈ [0,1]: 
 +  −  −  < 1 + ,  i.e.  +  + 1 −  > 0      (B.6) 
Proof for Proposition 1 
 
0*∗
0` = −1 + E +  −  −  + 1 +   
= 1 + E1 +  −  −  +  +  = 1 + E +  −  + 1  
As shown in equation (B.6) that  +  + 1 −  > 0, 0*∗0` > 0. 
Further, since 
0`
01 < 0, based on the chain rule of computing derivatives, we 














01 = 0`01 1 + E +  −  + 1, 
04*∗
0105 = 0`01 [−21 + g + E −  +  + 1 + E + 2 −  + 1]   
=
0`
01 1 + g[1 +  + 2 −  + 1 − 2 + E −  + ] 
That is, to show 
04*∗
0105 < 0, because 0`01 < 0, it remains to prove 
 1 +  + 2 −  + 1 − 2 + E −  +  > 0 
That is, to prove  + 2 −  + 1 +  + 2E −  +  − 2 − 2E + 2 −
2 > 0 
That is, to prove  + 1 +  +  +  >  +  +  
Since it has been shown  + 1 +  > , it remains to show  +  >  +  
First, since b<1,  > . Second, in equation (B.5), it needs to satisfy  +  −  −  >






Proof for Proposition 2 
 From the Lemma 2, it has been shown 
04*∗




0105 ∙ 050h > 0, as 
05
0h = −1 −  < 0.             
 
04*∗
010h > 0 suggests that the impact of the OSS patent pool on the threshold for new 
OSS product entry Δ∗ (OSS patent pool size x reduces this threshold) will be lower when 
θ is high. Therefore, on the other hand, the impact of the OSS patent pool on the 
threshold for new OSS product entry Δ∗ will be higher when the cumulativeness of 
innovation is high (i.e. when θ is low). 
Proof for Proposition 3 
 From the Lemma 2, it has been shown  
04*∗




0105 ∙ 050 > 0, as 
05
0 = −E < 0.  
 
04*∗
010 > 0 suggests that the impact of the OSS patent pool on the threshold for new 
OSS product entry Δ∗ (OSS patent pool size x reduces this threshold) will be lower when 
n is high. Therefore, on the other hand, the impact of the OSS patent pool on the 
threshold for new OSS product entry Δ∗ will be higher when the concentration of patent 




FOR CHAPTER 3: IDENTIFICATION OF SOFTWARE SEGMENTS 
AND THE MATCHING PATENT CLASSES 
C.1 Identify Software Segments 
 To measure entry with new OSS products related to different software segments 
in each year, a crucial step is to divide the software market into different segments that 
are reasonably distinct from each other. One main source of software segments is the 
product code classification system embedded in the PROMT database. For a portion of 
news articles from PROMT, there are a few product codes assigned to each new article 
that indicate what product category/categories are associated with that article. All these 
product categories are organized as a hierarchical structure by PROMT and are defined 
both in terms of customer segments and technologies. Table C.1 shows some examples of 
PROMT codes.  
 However, there are two drawbacks to just relying on PROMT classifications. 
First, a significant percentage (about 60%) of OSS product introduction news articles 
from PROMT is missing the product code field. Thus, I must manually assign product 
codes for this set of articles. Second, the PROMT classes do not include keywords, 
making it difficult to manually match articles to PROMT classes. Thus, I further match 
PROMT product code classes with CorpTech product code classes57  to take advantage of 
the keywords defined for each CorpTech product code. The resulting concordance table 
(denoted as the PROMT-CorpTech concordance hereafter) consists of about 80 PROMT 
                                                 
 
 
57 There are more than 290 software product codes (denoted as SOF) defined by CorpTech Directory. Each 
firm in this directory is associated with a set of self-reported product codes selected from these 290 SOF 
categories. 
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codes matched to CorpTech’s six-digit or seven-digit product codes. Each product code is 
associated with a set of technology phrases specific to that product code. This is used as a 
basis for me to identify (i) the PROMT articles with missing product codes and (ii) the 
related patents across a variety of software segments.  Table C.2 shows some examples of 
the PROMT-CorpTech concordance.  
C.2 Identify Patent Classes across Software Segments 
 Using the NBER patent data project and USPTO database, I constructed my 
patent dataset, which consists of all patents granted from 1976 to 2009. The sample 
period is from 1999 to 2009. To identify the related patents across a range of market 
segments from the PROMT-CorpTech concordance, I first examined specialist firms that 
produce in only one software segment and particularly only one CorpTech six- or seven-
digit code58 . The sample of single specialists is from the CorpTech directory, over 1992 
to 2004 and 2010.59  I found 3500 patents held by about 700 specialists that operate in 
different software markets from the PROMT-CorpTech concordance. The 3-digit USPTO 
classes to which the 3500 patents and their forward citations belong served as a starting 
point for me to map patent classes to each product code: for each product code, the top 
decile of these 3-digit US classes was used as candidates representing the core 
technologies for that code.  
 While the procedure I use is similar to the one used by Cockburn and MacGarvie 
(CM) (2011), I constructed my own classification for several reasons. First, my sample 
period is more recent than theirs, so the mapping between patent technologies and 
product markets may have changed over time. Second, Cockburn and MacGarvie 
examined 25 specific product codes that have incomplete overlap with the open source 
                                                 
 
 
58 Examples of CorpTech code are provided in Table C.2. 
59 Unfortunately, data from the CorpTech Directory from 2005 to 2009 was not available. 
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product market segments that I study. However, I did find many similarities between 
their classification and ours: for the product codes in both their and my classifications, 
the corresponding patent classes are very similar. Finally, I took the intersection of the 
patent classes from the patents in the OSS patent pool with the above mapping, which 
lead to 34 US patent classes and their corresponding product codes. 
C.3 Match Software Segments with Patent Class-subclass Combinations 
 Because most of the 3-digit US patent classes contain quite heterogeneous 
technologies, I then further generated a more detailed mapping between software product 
codes and US patent subclass levels by searching for technology phrases associated with 
each product code. This process generated the final mapping between software segments 
and patent class-subclass combinations. I further consolidated all product codes into 33 
software segments based on whether they are supported by the same technologies (similar 
patent classes), as I am most interested in whether the supply of certain technologies by 
the OSS patent pools helps start-ups move into new technology area. The final 
concordance that I used in the empirical analyses consists of 33 software segments 
matched to 422 patent class-subclass combinations. Table C.3 shows some examples of 
this final concordance between software segments and US patent class-subclass 










Table C.1 Examples of PROMT Codes 
7372502 Operating systems 
7372503 Operating system enhancements 
7372504 Graphical user interface software 
7372505 Portable document software 
7372510 Software development tools 
7372511 CASE software 
7372512 Programming utilities 
7372513 Application development software 
7372514 Debugging & testing software 
7372520 Peripheral support software 
7372521 Device driver software 
7372522 Data acquisition software 
7372523 Printer support software 
7372530 Disk/file management software 
 
Table C.2 Examples of the PROMT-CorpTech Concordance 
CorpTech Code PROMT Product Code 
SOF-CS-F 7372650 Fax software 
SOF-DM-M 7372421 DBMS 
SOF-HL-M 7372466 Medical practice software 
SOF-ME-S 7372544 Sound/audio software 
SOF-OA-MB 7372662 BBS software 
SOF-OA-MC 7372674 Videoconferencing software 
SOF-OA-ME 7372605 Electronic mail software 
SOF-OA-MG 7372630 Workgroup software 
SOF-OA-P 7372441 DTP software 
SOF-TS-EC 7372433 Civil engineering software 
SOF-TS-EE 7372434 Electrical engineering software 
SOF-TS-ER 7372423 Geographic information systems 
SOF-UT-H 7372521 Device driver software 
SOF-UT-O 7372561 Data center management software 
SOF-UT-Q 7372513 Application development software 







Table C.3 Examples of the Concordance between Segments and Patent Classes 
Software Segment US class Subclass Level 0 Subclass Level 1 
Artificial Intelligence Software 706 Fuzzy Logic Hardware Fuzzy Neural Network 
Artificial Intelligence Software 706 Knowledge Processing System Creation Or Modification 
Artificial Intelligence Software 706 Knowledge Processing System Knowledge Representation And Reasoning Technique 
Artificial Intelligence Software 706 Neural Network Learning Method 
Artificial Intelligence Software 706 Neural Network Learning Task 
Artificial Intelligence Software 706 Neural Network Neural Simulation Environment 
Artificial Intelligence Software 706 Neural Network Structure 
Artificial Intelligence Software 706 Plural Processing Systems 
Data Encryption Software 380 Communication System Using Cryptography Having Compression 
Data Encryption Software 380 Communication System Using Cryptography Time Segment Interchange 
Data Encryption Software 380 Facsimile Cryptography Including Generation Of An Associated Coded Record 
Data Encryption Software 380 Key Management Having Particular Key Generator 
Data Encryption Software 380 Key Management Key Distribution 
Data Encryption Software 380 Particular Algorithmic Function Encoding NBS/DES Algorithm 
Data Encryption Software 380 Particular Algorithmic Function Encoding Public Key 
Data Encryption Software 380 Video Cryptography Copy Protection Or Prevention 
Data Encryption Software 726 Access Control Or Authentication Network 
Data Encryption Software 726 Access Control Or Authentication Stand-Alone 
Data Encryption Software 726 
Monitoring Or Scanning Of Software Or Data 
Including Attack Prevention Intrusion Detection 
Data Encryption Software 726 Protection Of Hardware Theft Prevention 
Note: 1) US patent class 706 is described as “Data processing: artificial intelligence”; US patent class 380 is described as “Cryptography”; US patent class 726 is 
described as “Information security”. 2) All subclasses within each US patent class are structured hierarchically. “Subclass level 0” means the subclass is on the 





























(NT5) 7372420 Database software 
(NT6) 7372421 DBMS 




(NT5) 7372450 Image processing 
software 






(NT6) 7372414 Business information 
management software 
(NT6) 7372416 Manufacturing, 








(NT5) 7372510 Software development 
tools 
(NT6) 7372511 CASE software 
(NT6) 7372512 Programming utilities 
(NT6) 7372513 Application development 
software 
(NT6) 7372514 Debugging & testing 
software 
SOF-DM (Database/file mgmt. software) 
Keywords: Database/file management 
software, DBMS, Relational DBMS, 




SOF-OA-GI (Image processing software) 
Keywords: Image processing software, 







Keywords: Manufacturing automation 
protocol software, Operations planning 
software, Manufacturing planning 
software, Process control manufacturing 
systems software, Software to control 




SOF-PD (Program development soft.) 
Keywords: Software development 
systems, Development environment sof, 
IDEs, Language compilers, Program 
translator, program translators, Cross 
assemblers 
SOF-UT-C (Debugging and testing soft.) 























































Figure C.2 Mapping Software Segments to Patent Subclasses 
 
SOF-DM  
Keywords: Database/file management 
software, DBMS, Relational DBMS, 
Information storage and retrieval 






Keywords: Image processing 
software, Image analysis software, 






Keywords: Manufacturing automation 
protocol software, Operations 
planning software, Manufacturing 
planning software, Process control 
manufacturing systems software, 
Software to control product quality, 





Keywords: Software development 
systems, Development environment 
sof, IDEs, Language compilers, 
Program translator, program 
translators, Cross assemblers 
SOF-UT-C  
Keywords: Debugging and testing 
software 
 
707 Data processing: 
database and file 














700 Data processing: 
generic control systems or 
specific applications 
705 Data processing: 
financial, business 











Database or file accessing 
Database schema or data structure 
File or database maintenance 
Information retrieval 
Database structures  
Image compression or coding 
Image enhancement or restoration 
Image segmentation 
Image transformation or 
preprocessing 






Managing software components 
Programming language 
Software project management 
Testing or debugging 
Translation of code 





FOR CHAPTER 3: KEYWORDS USED TO IDENTIFY OSS ENTRY 
 
 I used the following set of keywords to search in PROMT news articles for 
introduction of software products that are licensed as open source. A software product is 
tagged as open source if it contains any of these keywords. I first implement automatic 
search and then manually check the results to ensure it is licensed as open source. The 
choice of open source license terms is based on the distribution of open source licenses 
used by OSS projects at SourceForge.net, which is the largest repository of OSS.   Over 
230,000 projects and over 3 million users and developers were registered before the end 
of year 2009 (SourceForge 2009). 
D.1 Keywords related to generic terms of OSS 
 open source , open-sourced, OSS, FLOSS, source code, GPL-compatible, non-
copyleft, copyleft, free software license, open source license, open-source license, public 
domain.  
D.2 Keywords related to open source licenses 
 GPL, General Public License , GNU, Lesser General Public License, LGPL, 
BSD, FreeBSD, Apache License, Apache Software License, Artistic License, MIT 
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